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December 11, 2005
Accepting Peace Prize, ElBaradei Calls for Nuclear Arms Cuts
By WALTER GIBBS
OSLO, Dec. 10 - The world should stop treating the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea as isolated cases and instead deal with them in a common effort to eliminate poverty, organized crime and armed conflict, the director general of the United Nations' nuclear monitoring agency said Saturday in accepting the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.

The director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, said a "good start" would be for the United States and other nuclear powers to cut nuclear weapon stockpiles sharply and redirect spending toward international development.

"More than 15 years after the end of the cold war, it is incomprehensible to many that the major nuclear weapon states operate with their arsenals on hair-trigger alert," Dr. ElBaradei, 63, said.

Despite some disarmament, he continued, the existence of 27,000 nuclear warheads in various hands around the world still hold the prospect of "the devastation of entire nations in a matter of minutes."

Feelings of insecurity and humiliation, exaggerated by today's nuclear imbalance, are behind the spread of bomb-development programs at the national level, said Dr. ElBaradei, who has headed the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1997. No less dangerous, he added, are the presumed efforts of extremist groups to acquire nuclear materials. With goods, ideas and people moving more freely than ever, the containment of nuclear technology must be part of a broad global effort, he said.

"We cannot respond to these threats by building more walls, developing bigger weapons or dispatching more troops," he said. "These threats require primarily multinational cooperation." Dr. ElBaradei said the manufacture and sale of nuclear fuel for power generation, which can also be enriched to make bombs, should be placed under multinational control, with his agency operating as a "reserve fuel bank" for accredited nations.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee divided the 2005 award between Dr. ElBaradei and the atomic energy agency as a whole. Dr. ElBaradei and Yukiya Amano, the agency's board chairman, were awarded diplomas and medals in a colorful ceremony before more than 1,000 dignitaries at Oslo City Hall.

The committee chairman, Ole Danbolt Mjos, lauded Dr. ElBaradei and his agency for resisting "heavy pressure" in 2003 to fall in line with an American contention that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program despite the failure of the agency's inspectors to find hard evidence. "As the world could see after the war in Iraq, the weapons that were not found proved not to have existed," Mr. Mjos said.

In what appeared to be an allusion to that episode, Dr. ElBaradei said: "Armed with the strength of our convictions, we will continue to speak truth to power, and we will continue to carry out our mandate with independence and objectivity."

For the Nobel committee, this year's choice of winners was a return to basics after last year's untraditional award to Wangari Maathai, a Kenyan environmentalist whose tree-planting campaigns are only tangentially related to war and peace. When Alfred Nobel, the Swedish industrialist who helped develop dynamite, died in 1897, he left money in his will to honor someone each year "who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between the nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses."

Dr. ElBaradei and the agency will split this year's prize money of 10 million Swedish kroner (about $1.3 million) and have promised their shares to charitable causes.



Copyright 2005The New York Times Company

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December 10, 2005
Head of Nuclear Agency Again Urges Iran to Cooperate
By WALTER GIBBS
OSLO, Dec. 9 - Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warned Iran on Friday to stop hindering an investigation into the country's nuclear energy program, which the United States and many other observers suspect is a cover to develop nuclear weapons.

"The international community has begun to lose its patience," he told reporters here before a ceremony on Saturday at which he is to be awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.

While denouncing Iran's repeated delays in accommodating inspectors from his agency, Dr. ElBaradei also said that forcing a showdown on the matter now could backfire. The United States has urged the agency to report Iran's history of concealment and sluggish cooperation to the United Nations Security Council for possible punitive measures.

"Let us not think we should jump the gun and use enforcement," said Dr. ElBaradei, adding that no "smoking gun" had emerged to prove that Iran's intent was hostile. "If you can wiggle your way to cooperation, that is better than the alternative."

He took a similar approach before the invasion of Iraq, when, he said, inspectors had turned up no evidence to support the Bush administration's claim that Saddam Hussein had revived an old nuclear weapons program. The subsequent failure of American troops to find such evidence seemed to vindicate Dr. ElBaradei, while burnishing his Nobel credentials.

According to scientists and policy analysts, the case against Iran's openly belligerent regime is harder to dismiss because the existence of its uranium-enrichment program, ostensibly to produce energy, is not in doubt. The question is whether the program will be modified out of view of the atomic energy agency to make bombs.

"ElBaradei needs a touch of Churchill now," said Paul Leventhal, founder and now president emeritus of the Nuclear Control Institute, a nonprofit research center based in Washington. "He must acknowledge the unique danger of this regime, which is comparable to the rise of Hitler in the 1930's. The Nobel will give him a bully pulpit if he's prepared to use it. But so far he has put a rosy picture on things in order to avoid a crisis."

The perception that Dr. ElBaradei has obstructed the United States' plans for Iraq and Iran was possibly behind a yearlong push by members of the Bush administration to deny him a third term as director general of the atomic energy agency. When Washington found itself isolated on the matter, it joined the agency's 35-nation board in re-electing him by acclamation in September.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee divided this year's Peace Prize in equal measures between Dr. ElBaradei and the agency itself. The duties of the I.A.E.A. include monitoring adherence to the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and promoting the safe use of nuclear technology for energy and medicine.

Steve Fetter, a nonproliferation specialist and dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, praised the choice of winners and said Dr. ElBaradei had few options in Iran apart from continued negotiation.

"What do people mean by 'enforcement?' " asked Professor Fetter. "I think they mean something like what we just did in Iraq. The stakes are that high."

At his news conference on Friday, Dr. ElBaradei said: "I don't believe there is a military solution to the problem. I believe that would be counterproductive."

He said the Middle East, including Iran, was one of three "hotbeds" in the world where nuclear-tinged political conflict endangered many people. The others are the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea claims to have built nuclear weapons, and South Asia, where Pakistan and India face off with nuclear weapons.

Dr. ElBaradei took the established nuclear powers to task, saying they had neglected their treaty obligations to reduce weapon stockpiles. A world of nuclear "haves and have-nots," he said, is unsustainable. He criticized the Bush administration in particular for considering the development of a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons.

"Whether you call them mini-nukes or bunker-busters, it's sending the wrong message," he said.

The Nobel Peace Prize includes a cash prize of 10 million Swedish kronor, or about $1.3 million, which Dr. ElBaradei and the agency will split evenly. He said he would donate his prize money to orphanages in Egypt, his native country. Yukiya Amano, chairman of the agency's board, said its share would go toward cancer treatment and nutrition in the developing world.

Council Criticizes Iranian Leader

By The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 9 - The Security Council on Friday joined in the widespread international condemnation of remarks by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran questioning the Holocaust and suggesting that Israel be moved to Europe.

The Council echoed a statement on Thursday by Secretary General Kofi Annan noting that the General Assembly had recently adopted a resolution rejecting "denial of the Holocaust as a historical event, either in full or in part."

Germany and Austria registered strong protests with Iranian envoys while Russia, which maintains close relations with Iran, said, "It is difficult to comment on such unacceptable remarks."

Turkey, a Muslim ally of Israel, said, "It is impossible to approve of such statements of bellicose nature at a time when dialogue, reconciliation and cooperation is needed."

Jack Straw, the foreign secretary of Britain, the current president of the European Union, said the comments were "wholly unacceptable, and I condemn them unreservedly."



Copyright 2005The New York Times Company

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Iran Invites U.S. to Bid on Nuclear Plant
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By NASSER KARIMI
Associated Press Writer

December 11 2005, 7:48 AM PST

TEHRAN, Iran -- Iran on Sunday offered the United States a share in building a new nuclear power plant in an apparent effort to curb U.S. opposition to its atomic program.

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wi...,0,252100.story

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IRAN: Tehran has exploited the gap between Washington and Europe.
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By Alan Isenberg
Alan Isenberg writes for Newsweek International. He recently completed a fellowship at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation that focused on Iran's nuclear program.

December 11 2005

OVER THE last four years, and especially under radical new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran has done its best to live up to President Bush's 2002 declaration that it is part of an "axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."

The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday...-sunday-opinion

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GL10Df01.html


US turns the screws on deal with India
By Ramtanu Maitra

The "historic" US-India nuclear deal of July 18, on which Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wants to situate his legacy, is in trouble. It is evident that the US Congress is keen to extract the proverbial pound of flesh before it approves the deal. It also seems the optimism that prevailed in the Indian camp earlier is vanishing fast and what India will have to surrender to get the deal through could well be the new worry of New Delhi.

At the end of November, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was in Washington to attend the inaugural session of the Indo-US High Technology Cooperation Group's meeting. Addressing the session, the Indian visitor said: "The nuclear agreement, as would be appreciated, has larger implications for high-technology trade as it is premised on US recognition of India's impeccable record on non-proliferation. It not only recognizes that non-proliferation is better served with India as a partner, but also sends a clear signal that India cannot be a partner and a target at the same time of technology denial regime." It is evident that the Indian foreign secretary's efforts to grease the wheels did not accomplish much.

The crunch
On November 18, a group of US nuclear non-proliferation experts [1] (some call them the American "ayatollahs of non-proliferation"), sent an open letter to the House of Representatives urging the lawmakers "to critically examine the July 18 proposal to allow for 'full' US-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation, which would require significant changes to US non-proliferation laws and long-standing international non-proliferation policy that have been supported and advanced by past Republican and Democratic administrations".

All the individuals who have put their signatures to the letter are like hallowed institutions in Washington, shoring up for years the increasingly tattered American non-proliferation policy.

In case the lawmakers missed the point, this powerful group pointed out that President George W Bush and administration officials involved with the proposed agreement had withheld the key details needed to help Congress fully understand the implications of the proposal.

"Accordingly, we urge that before any action is taken on any legislation sent up by the administration to implement the proposal, Congress should obtain detailed answers to a number of questions," they said.

The sticking point is that "so far, India has pledged only to accept voluntary safeguards over 'civilian' nuclear facilities of its choosing", they pointed out. "This could allow India to withdraw any nuclear facility from [International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA]) safeguards for national security reasons. Such an arrangement would be purely symbolic and would do nothing to prevent the continued production of fissile material for weapons by India."

They also said "the supply of nuclear fuel to India would free up its existing stockpile and capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons. To help ensure that US civilian nuclear cooperation is not in any way advancing India's weapons program, it would be essential to apply permanent, facility-specific safeguards on a mutually agreed and broad list of current and future Indian nuclear facilities involved in civilian activities and electricity production in combination with a cutoff of Indian fissile material production for weapons."

The group then went on to recommend that "specifically, civilian nuclear assistance should not be extended to India until it implements a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons, which has been adopted by the five original nuclear-weapon states".

Another fear expressed by the group is that the arrangement proposed by the Bush administration could also trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which are an important barrier against the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technologies for weapons purposes.

Urging the lawmakers not to provide any civilian assistance to India without the full concurrence of the NSG and approval of India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the group said: "The proposed civil nuclear cooperation arrangement may also undermine our ability to win necessary international support for persuading Iran to abandon its fuel cycle plans and to make its nuclear program fully transparent to the IAEA."

Snowballing effect
It was evident from the outset that Tehran's development of a nuclear program, which New Delhi condemns as well, and Washington's difficulties in dealing with the situation in Tehran, would be linked by the opponents of the Bush-Manmohan Singh deal in their attempt to kill it.

But, perhaps, the group went even a step further, saying the deal could persuade states who "have for decades remained true to the original NPT [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] bargain and forsworn nuclear weapons" to "make a different choice in the future if non-NPT members [such as India] receive civil nuclear assistance under less rigorous terms."

New Delhi, without giving the group's open letter any publicity, saw the red flag and sent Shyam Saran. It is evident that the Indian foreign secretary did not achieve much.

On November 30, Congressman Edward Markey and ranking member in the Energy and Commerce Committee, sent a letter to Bush along with the group's expressed concerns and a set of questions for consideration on proposed nuclear cooperation with India, "respectfully requesting" the White House to "provide responses to all of the questions that these experts have raised about various aspects of the proposal".

A copy of the letter, and the attachment, were also sent to the US secretary of defense and the secretary of state.

On December 7, the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, addressing the Aspen Strategic Group, made clear his concerns, pointing out India had to first separate its civilian and military nuclear programs and place all its nuclear reactors under IAEA inspections.

Lugar said an "opaque or incomprehensible" Indian separation plan would only raise more questions, particularly in Congress, about India's intentions. "More generally, as a politician in the United States Senate charged with guiding this agreement through the legislative branch, I would urge the Indian side to think in maximalist [sic] terms and include as many facilities as possible within the scope of the civilian declaration," he said.

"Conversely, a minimalist approach will likely only delay consideration of this initiative in the US Congress and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Or, at worst, it could result in unfavorable action by one or both bodies," Lugar said.

Although pointing out that he was issuing no threat, Lugar said, "While the Bush administration has, I think, been very clear in discussions with the Indian government about its expectations, let me emphasize that any Indian plan will have to pass muster with the United States Congress."

Lugar's position would require India to give up a major portion of its military nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, which would effectively cap India's deterrence, some observers claim. In other words, they say, India would be left exposed and vulnerable, self-defeating the country nuclear weapons' program and its defense.

The Nunn-Lugar Act
It is not difficult to understand why Lugar wanted the plan to be "credible, transparent and defensible from a non-proliferation standpoint". He, along with former Democratic senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, was instrumental in getting Congress to pass the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Act in 1991.

This was after the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991; Soviet nuclear weapons were in the hands of four suddenly independent republics - Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - whose leadership appeared confused and wobbly.

In response to that threatening turn of events, Nunn and Lugar persuaded Congress to pass the CTR program to provide assistance for dismantling or safely storing the weapons in the Soviet nuclear arsenal. This came to be known as the Nunn-Lugar Act.

The act, which was funded by a congressionally authorized transfer of $400 million from Department of Defense operations and maintenance accounts to Nunn-Lugar projects in fiscal year 1992, focused on weapon destruction and security.

While the act has been criticized widely, particularly the transfer of aid part of it, there are many in Washington who realize that it helped destroy large numbers of nuclear warheads and diminished threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

In dealing with the US-India nuclear deal, it would be naive to expect that Lugar would not take an extremely hard stand on the issue of India and weapons of mass destruction.

For New Delhi, the question is: where to go from here? It is evident that Manmohan's recent three-day visit to Moscow had a civilian nuclear element. It seems that Russian President Vladimir Putin is perfectly willing to sell more of his light water reactors (LWRs)to India. Russia has sold India two 1,000 MW reactors, but could not promise any more because Russia, being a part of the NSG, cannot afford to violate the laws laid down by the NSG.

The obstacles
During Singh's discussions in Moscow, it was evident that the Russians would supply more enriched uranium-fueled LWRs if the US-India nuclear cooperation deal went through. That means, Moscow will not independently deal with the NSG vis-a-vis India, and will rely on Washington to get NSG approval.

In other words, if the US Congress in the short term does not approve the Bush-Manmohan deal, nothing much will help India in its plan to import nuclear reactors from abroad and solve some of its long-term electricity requirements. In this situation, strategic ties with Moscow will not help New Delhi one bit.

And there is nothing much India can do. However, there are some developments of which New Delhi should take note.

A great deal of the problem vis-a-vis getting the nuclear deal through Congress lies in the weakening of the Bush administration. At present, the White House is being pummeled from all sides, starting with the Iraq war. This is taking its toll on Republican lawmakers worried about elections in 2006, and they have begun to raise questions on issues they would not have previously questioned.

The Bush-Manmohan nuclear deal could be one issue where some Republicans will express their increasing independence from the White House. As for the Democrats, it is likely that most of them will not like to concede the White House even an inch.

It is also unlikely that the White House will have the energy and verve to do what is necessary to get the deal through. In addition, something else has begun to bother the Indians. Addressing the John Hopkins University on December 1, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and an apparent promoter of the deal, Nicholas Burns, alleged Indian commitments on Iran.

Burns said, "The Indians have assured us there is no [energy] plan on the table that is ready for decision by the Iranian and Indian governments, that any plans, any discussions, have been hypothetical and are years away."

While returning from Moscow with the Indian premier, minister Saran told the media that he did not remember anyone giving the Americans any such assurance.

If Saran is telling the truth, it means Washington has come to believe that New Delhi is desperate for the ratification of the July agreement and will be willing to accommodate some American demands that could help the Bush administration on the domestic scene.

Note [1] The signatories include Hal Bengelsdorf, consultant, and former director of the Office for Non-proliferation Policy at the Energy Department and former office director for nuclear affairs at the State Department; Robert J Einhorn, senior adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies and former assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation; John Holum, former under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs and former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Victor Gilinsky, energy consultant and former US nuclear regulatory commissioner, among 12 others.

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)

Mohamed ElBaradei - Nobel Lecture



Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2005.



Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Honourable Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.



The International Atomic Energy Agency and I are humbled, proud, delighted and above all strengthened in our resolve by this most worthy of honours.



My sister-in-law works for a group that supports orphanages in Cairo.

She and her colleagues take care of children left behind by circumstances beyond their control. They feed these children, clothe them and teach them to read.



At the International Atomic Energy Agency, my colleagues and I work to keep nuclear materials out of the reach of extremist groups. We inspect nuclear facilities all over the world, to be sure that peaceful nuclear activities are not being used as a cloak for weapons programmes.



My sister-in-law and I are working towards the same goal, through different paths: the security of the human family.



But why has this security so far eluded us?



I believe it is because our security strategies have not yet caught up with the risks we are facing. The globalization that has swept away the barriers to the movement of goods, ideas and people has also swept with it barriers that confined and localized security threats.



A recent United Nations High-Level Panel identified five categories of threats that we face:



1. Poverty, Infectious Disease, and Environmental Degradation;

2. Armed Conflict - both within and among states;

3. Organized Crime;

4. Terrorism; and

5. Weapons of Mass Destruction.



These are all 'threats without borders' - where traditional notions of national security have become obsolete. We cannot respond to these threats by building more walls, developing bigger weapons, or dispatching more troops. Quite to the contrary. By their very nature, these security threats require primarily multinational cooperation.



But what is more important is that these are not separate or distinct threats. When we scratch the surface, we find them closely connected and interrelated.



We are 1,000 people here today in this august hall. Imagine for a moment that we represent the world's population. These 200 people on my left would be the wealthy of the world, who consume 80 per cent of the available resources. And these 400 people on my right would be living on an income of less than $2 per day.



This underprivileged group of people on my right is no less intelligent or less worthy than their fellow human beings on the other side of the aisle. They were simply born into this fate.



In the real world, this imbalance in living conditions inevitably leads to inequality of opportunity, and in many cases loss of hope.

And what is worse, all too often the plight of the poor is compounded by and results in human rights abuses, a lack of good governance, and a deep sense of injustice. This combination naturally creates a most fertile breeding ground for civil wars, organized crime, and extremism in its different forms.



In regions where conflicts have been left to fester for decades, countries continue to look for ways to offset their insecurities or project their 'power'. In some cases, they may be tempted to seek their own weapons of mass destruction, like others who have preceded them.

* * * * * * *



Ladies and Gentlemen.



Fifteen years ago, when the Cold War ended, many of us hoped for a new world order to emerge. A world order rooted in human solidarity - a world order that would be equitable, inclusive and effective.



But today we are nowhere near that goal. We may have torn down the walls between East and West, but we have yet to build the bridges between North and South - the rich and the poor.



Consider our development aid record. Last year, the nations of the world spent over $1 trillion on armaments. But we contributed less than 10 per cent of that amount - a mere $80 billion - as official development assistance to the developing parts of the world, where 850 million people suffer from hunger.



My friend James Morris heads the World Food Programme, whose task it is to feed the hungry. He recently told me, "If I could have just 1 per cent of the money spent on global armaments, no one in this world would go to bed hungry."



It should not be a surprise then that poverty continues to breed conflict. Of the 13 million deaths due to armed conflict in the last ten years, 9 million occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, where the poorest of the poor live.



Consider also our approach to the sanctity and value of human life.

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, we all grieved deeply, and expressed outrage at this heinous crime - and rightly so. But many people today are unaware that, as the result of civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3.8 million people have lost their lives since 1998.



Are we to conclude that our priorities are skewed, and our approaches uneven?

* * * * * * *



Ladies and Gentlemen. With this 'big picture' in mind, we can better understand the changing landscape in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.



There are three main features to this changing landscape: the emergence of an extensive black market in nuclear material and equipment; the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology; and the stagnation in nuclear disarmament.



Today, with globalization bringing us ever closer together, if we choose to ignore the insecurities of some, they will soon become the insecurities of all.



Equally, with the spread of advanced science and technology, as long as some of us choose to rely on nuclear weapons, we continue to risk that these same weapons will become increasingly attractive to others.



I have no doubt that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security.



To that end, we must ensure - absolutely - that no more countries acquire these deadly weapons.



We must see to it that nuclear-weapon states take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament.



And we must put in place a security system that does not rely on nuclear deterrence.

* * * * * * *



Are these goals realistic and within reach? I do believe they are.

But then three steps are urgently required.



First, keep nuclear and radiological material out of the hands of extremist groups. In 2001, the IAEA together with the international community launched a worldwide campaign to enhance the security of such material. Protecting nuclear facilities. Securing powerful radioactive sources. Training law enforcement officials. Monitoring border crossings. In four years, we have completed perhaps 50 per cent of the work. But this is not fast enough, because we are in a race against time.



Second, tighten control over the operations for producing the nuclear material that could be used in weapons. Under the current system, any country has the right to master these operations for civilian uses.

But in doing so, it also masters the most difficult steps in making a nuclear bomb.



To overcome this, I am hoping that we can make these operations multinational - so that no one country can have exclusive control over any such operation. My plan is to begin by setting up a reserve fuel bank, under IAEA control, so that every country will be assured that it will get the fuel needed for its bona fide peaceful nuclear activities. This assurance of supply will remove the incentive - and the justification - for each country to develop its own fuel cycle.

We should then be able to agree on a moratorium on new national facilities, and to begin work on multinational arrangements for enrichment, fuel production, waste disposal and reprocessing.



We must also strengthen the verification system. IAEA inspections are the heart and soul of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To be effective, it is essential that we are provided with the necessary authority, information, advanced technology, and resources. And our inspections must be backed by the UN Security Council, to be called on in cases of non-compliance.



Third, accelerate disarmament efforts. We still have eight or nine countries who possess nuclear weapons. We still have 27,000 warheads in existence. I believe this is 27,000 too many.



A good start would be if the nuclear-weapon states reduced the strategic role given to these weapons. More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, it is incomprehensible to many that the major nuclear-weapon states operate with their arsenals on hair-trigger alert - such that, in the case of a possible launch of a nuclear attack, their leaders could have only 30 minutes to decide whether to retaliate, risking the devastation of entire nations in a matter of minutes.



These are three concrete steps that, I believe, can readily be taken.

Protect the material and strengthen verification. Control the fuel cycle. Accelerate disarmament efforts.



But that is not enough. The hard part is: how do we create an environment in which nuclear weapons - like slavery or genocide - are regarded as a taboo and a historical anomaly?

* * * * * * *



Ladies and Gentlemen.



Whether one believes in evolution, intelligent design, or Divine Creation, one thing is certain. Since the beginning of history, human beings have been at war with each other, under the pretext of religion, ideology, ethnicity and other reasons. And no civilization has ever willingly given up its most powerful weapons. We seem to agree today that we can share modern technology, but we still refuse to acknowledge that our values - at their very core - are shared values.



I am an Egyptian Muslim, educated in Cairo and New York, and now living in Vienna. My wife and I have spent half our lives in the North, half in the South. And we have experienced first hand the unique nature of the human family and the common values we all share.



Shakespeare speaks of every single member of that family in The Merchant of Venice, when he asks: "If you prick us, do we not bleed?

If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?

And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?"



And lest we forget:



There is no religion that was founded on intolerance - and no religion that does not value the sanctity of human life.



Judaism asks that we value the beauty and joy of human existence.



Christianity says we should treat our neighbours as we would be treated.



Islam declares that killing one person unjustly is the same as killing all of humanity.



Hinduism recognizes the entire universe as one family.



Buddhism calls on us to cherish the oneness of all creation.



Some would say that it is too idealistic to believe in a society based on tolerance and the sanctity of human life, where borders, nationalities and ideologies are of marginal importance. To those I say, this is not idealism, but rather realism, because history has taught us that war rarely resolves our differences. Force does not heal old wounds; it opens new ones.

* * * * * * *



Ladies and Gentlemen.



I have talked about our efforts to combat the misuse of nuclear energy. Let me now tell you how this very same energy is used for the benefit of humankind.



At the IAEA, we work daily on every continent to put nuclear and radiation techniques in the service of humankind. In Vietnam, farmers plant rice with greater nutritional value that was developed with IAEA assistance. Throughout Latin America, nuclear technology is being used to map underground aquifers, so that water supplies can be managed sustainably. In Ghana, a new radiotherapy machine is offering cancer treatment to thousands of patients. In the South Pacific, Japanese scientists are using nuclear techniques to study climate change. In India, eight new nuclear plants are under construction, to provide clean electricity for a growing nation - a case in point of the rising expectation for a surge in the use of nuclear energy worldwide.



These projects, and a thousand others, exemplify the IAEA ideal:

Atoms for Peace.



But the expanding use of nuclear energy and technology also makes it crucial that nuclear safety and security are maintained at the highest level.



Since the Chernobyl accident, we have worked all over the globe to raise nuclear safety performance. And since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have worked with even greater intensity on nuclear security. On both fronts, we have built an international network of legal norms and performance standards. But our most tangible impact has been on the ground. Hundreds of missions, in every part of the world, with international experts making sure nuclear activities are safe and secure.



I am very proud of the 2,300 hard working men and women that make up the IAEA staff - the colleagues with whom I share this honour. Some of them are here with me today. We come from over 90 countries. We bring many different perspectives to our work. Our diversity is our strength.



We are limited in our authority. We have a very modest budget. And we have no armies.



But armed with the strength of our convictions, we will continue to speak truth to power. And we will continue to carry out our mandate with independence and objectivity.



The Nobel Peace Prize is a powerful message for us - to endure in our efforts to work for security and development. A durable peace is not a single achievement, but an environment, a process and a commitment.

* * * * * * *



Ladies and Gentlemen.



The picture I have painted today may have seemed somewhat grim. Let me conclude by telling you why I have hope.



I have hope because the positive aspects of globalization are enabling nations and peoples to become politically, economically and socially interdependent, making war an increasingly unacceptable option.



Among the 25 members of the European Union, the degree of economic and socio-political dependencies has made the prospect of the use of force to resolve differences almost absurd. The same is emerging with regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with some 55 member countries from Europe, Central Asia and North America. Could these models be expanded to a world model, through the same creative multilateral engagement and active international cooperation, where the strong are just and the weak secure?



I have hope because civil society is becoming better informed and more engaged. They are pressing their governments for change - to create democratic societies based on diversity, tolerance and equality. They are proposing creative solutions. They are raising awareness, donating funds, working to transform civic spirit from the local to the global. Working to bring the human family closer together.



We now have the opportunity, more than at any time before, to give an affirmative answer to one of the oldest questions of all time: "Am I my brother's keeper?"



What is required is a new mindset and a change of heart, to be able to see the person across the ocean as our neighbour.



Finally, I have hope because of what I see in my children, and some of their generation.



I took my first trip abroad at the age of 19. My children were even more fortunate than I. They had their first exposure to foreign culture as infants, and they were raised in a multicultural environment. And I can say absolutely that my son and daughter are oblivious to colour and race and nationality. They see no difference between their friends Noriko, Mafupo, Justin, Saulo and Hussam; to them, they are only fellow human beings and good friends.



Globalization, through travel, media and communication, can also help us - as it has with my children and many of their peers - to see each other simply as human beings.

* * * * * * *



Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen.



Imagine what would happen if the nations of the world spent as much on development as on building the machines of war. Imagine a world where every human being would live in freedom and dignity. Imagine a world in which we would shed the same tears when a child dies in Darfur or Vancouver. Imagine a world where we would settle our differences through diplomacy and dialogue and not through bombs or bullets. Imagine if the only nuclear weapons remaining were the relics in our museums. Imagine the legacy we could leave to our children.



Imagine that such a world is within our grasp.

PROLIFERATION NEWS
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
December 13, 2005

Mohamed ElBaradei's Nobel Message
(New York Times - Editorial)

Tuesday, December 13
Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, infuriated the Bush administration a few years ago by challenging its baseless claims that Iraq was preparing to resume nuclear weapons work. It turns out that Dr. ElBaradei can also be usefully outspoken about real nuclear dangers.

In his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo last Saturday, Dr. ElBaradei spoke of the need to give his agency new tools to deal with countries, like Iran, that exploit their legal right to experiment with civilian nuclear technologies to master all the steps necessary to build nuclear bombs. But he also stressed the importance of global nonproliferation efforts, including the need for the established nuclear powers to make sharper reductions in their cold war arsenals. He noted that there were still about 27,000 nuclear warheads lying around, many of them on hair-trigger alert. An overwhelming majority are located in Russia or the United States.


A Brief History of the Nuclear Age
(Joseph Cirincione, Globalist)

Tuesday, December 13
Nuclear weapons were dangerous enough in the hands of states. Now, with the threat of nuclear terrorism, this danger is even more pronounced. Cirincione takes a historical look at the nuclear age and examines what progress has been made in securing and reducing these weapons.

Atomic bombs began with the Nazis. In 1939, Albert Einstein was afraid that Hitler would use the recent discoveries of nuclear fission to make a super weapon. His fellow physicists and émigrés from fascism, Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi, helped him write his famous letter to President Franklin Roosevelt.

The world's most celebrated scientist warned FDR that it might be "possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power would be generated."



Iran Offers US Share in Plant
(Nasser Karimi, Associated Press)

Monday, December 12
Iran opened the door yesterday for US help in building a nuclear power plant -- a move designed to ease American suspicions that Tehran is using its nuclear program as a cover to build atomic weapons.

The offer, which did not seem likely to win acceptance in Washington, was issued as Israel said it had not ruled out a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

''America can take part in international bidding for the construction of Iran's nuclear power plant if they observe the basic standards and quality," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said at a news conference.



Israel Won't Rule Out Strike on Iran Nuclear Sites
(Dan Williams, Reuters)

Sunday, December 11
Israel is not ruling out military action against arch-foe Iran's nuclear programme but for now prefers to let foreign diplomatic pressure on Tehran run its course, a senior Israeli official said on Sunday. Amos Gilad, chief of strategic and security planning in the Defence Ministry, spoke after Britain's Sunday Times newspaper said Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had put armed forces on standby for a March strike on Iranian uranium enrichment sites.

Gilad denied such a plan was in place. But he said Israel -- which bombed the main Iraqi atomic reactor at Osiraq in 1981, driving Saddam Hussein's quest for the bomb underground -- could eventually consider a similar military option against Iran. "It would not be correct for a country that faces such a threat to deny that it would ever consider another option (other than diplomacy)," Gilad told Israel Radio. "One cannot say a priori that any option for the future is being ruled out.



Iran's Tough Nuclear Stance Dims Hope for Talks
(Mark Heinrich, Reuters)

Monday, December 12
Iran's insistence on enriching uranium on its own soil may undermine the basis for possible new talks this month on defusing Tehran's nuclear standoff with the West, diplomats and analysts said on Monday.

Iran said on Saturday diplomacy would revive on December 21 after a four-month freeze and focus on "our right" to a full nuclear-fuel production cycle that the West fears could yield an atomic bomb. Tehran says it would only power civilian reactors. But Iranian leaders have dismissed in advance an EU-backed proposal for its uranium to be purified in Russia as "a failed idea" and is urging the United States and European Union powers to "pay attention to the realities".

Diplomats within the EU3 -- Britain, France and Germany -- said December 21 had been provisionally set aside for talks but there might be little to discuss given Iranian preconditions.



KEDO Told to Leave North Korea
(Ser Myo-Ja, JoongAng Ilbo)

Tuesday, December 13
Pyongyang has told the KEDO Office in Kumho, North Korea, to withdraw all its workers at the nuclear power reactor construction site in the North by early January. The office is a branch of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, a group overseeing work on two nuclear reactors there.

South Korean and KEDO officials told the JoongAng Daily that the North had also said KEDO would not be allowed to repatriate equipment and materials at the construction site on North Korea's east coast.

The 1994 Agreed Framework, signed by North Korea and the United States, promised the reactors in compensation for Pyongyang's freeze of its nuclear activities. Construction at the site began in 1997, but was suspended in 2003 after the North resumed clandestine attempts to develop weapons. A caretaker force of about 110 people works at the site.



"Getting Serious" About North Korea
(Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today)

December 2005
Despite the breakthrough agreement in September on a Joint Statement of Principles outlining a series of action-for-action steps to denuclearize North Korea in a verifiable manner, the main antagonists are again at odds over the substance and sequencing of the deal.

Following an unproductive round of six-party talks last month, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called on North Korea to “get serious” about dismantling its nuclear program. North Korea, however, insists that the United States must act first before it freezes and then dismantles its nuclear weapons program.

Enough already. To break the cycle and test Pyongyang’s seriousness, President George W. Bush should borrow a page from his father’s playbook: unilateral, reciprocal actions that demonstrate the good faith of both sides and improve the likelihood of success.



Related Links:

"The Nobel Lecture," Statement by IAEA Director General ElBaradei, Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony, 10 December 2005




Upcoming Event:

Representative David Hobson (R-OH) will speak at the Center for American Progress on Wednesday, December 14, 2005 from 9:00 - 10:00am on how his subcommittee forced the Bush Administration to rethink its strategy on development of a nuclear charged bunker buster bomb. Hobson will also address a number of other topics before his subcommittees, including current U.S. policy in Iraq, reconstruction of the southeast Louisiana levee system and U.S. efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials. The Center for American Progress is located at 1333 H Street, NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. Click here to RSVP: www.americanprogress.org/hobsonreg.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/resources...?fa=newsletters

IRAN NUKES

- Iran At Nuclear Point Of No-Return By March Says Israel
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iran-05zzzzzzzn.html

Jerusalem (AFP) Dec 13, 2005 - Iran will have acquired all the necessary technological know-how to build a nuclear bomb by March, Israeli chief of staff Dan Halutz said on Tuesday.

- Tehran gives first praise for Russian nuclear plan
http://www.spacewar.com/2005/051213182707.c2twvae7.html

U.S. Weighs Whether to Build Some New Nuclear Warheads
(Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal)

Wednesday, December 14
On this remote mesa where the atom bomb was born, a fresh question is in the air: Does the U.S. need new nuclear weapons?

Some 15 years after the Cold War, and at a time when the U.S. is demanding others restrain their nuclear ambitions, the Bush administration thinks the answer is yes. With little notice, it has been pressing Congress to fund research into a new generation of nuclear weapons.

Lawmakers have twice turned down proposals to design a new nuclear "bunker-buster" bomb, to blow up buried caches of weapons. But last month, with little debate, Congress approved $25 million for research into what is supposed to be a sturdier, more reliable warhead than those designed during the Cold War. If the work is successful, the U.S. could someday spend billions of dollars replacing much of the current arsenal.

Hobson Vows to Continue Opposition to RNEP
(Joe Fiorill, Global Security Newswire)

Wednesday, December 14
U.S. Representative David Hobson (R-Ohio) vowed today to continue opposing any present or future Bush administration attempts to revive study of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (see GSN, Nov. 16).

Hobson, chairman of the House Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee, said during a Center for American Progress appearance that some in President George W. Bush’s administration would continue to support the project but that most members of Congress would oppose the nuclear “bunker buster.”

“I haven’t heard anything that they’re going to bring it back,” Hobson said, “although I must tell you, [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld said, ‘You may win this year, but we’ll be back.’ I said, ‘Well, OK, I’ll still be here.’”

Talks Stalled, U.S. Envoy Matches Insults of North Korea
(James Brooke, New York Times)

Thursday, December 15
The nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea will continue, the American envoy said with an evenness polished by nearly three decades in the Foreign Service. "We have been there before, we have seen similar brinkmanship tactics from the North Koreans in the past," said Mr. Vershbow, a Russian expert who arrived here two months ago. "We remain ready to resume the talks." But lately, both sides seem to be playing at brinkmanship.

In three appearances over the last week, Ambassador Vershbow has seemingly gone out of his way to talk tough to the North Koreans. In a news conference last Wednesday he referred to North Korea's government seven times as "a criminal regime." Noting that North Korea tries to make money by counterfeiting American currency, he said, "North Korea is the first regime that has done that since Adolf Hitler."

Indian PM Says No Changes to India-US Nuclear Deal
(AFX)

Thursday, December 15
India said it will not allow changes to a nuclear deal with the United States, to ensure its passage by the US Congress.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told parliament the landmark deal struck with US President George W Bush when he visited Washington in July, giving New Delhi access to civilian atomic technology, was a 'binding commitment.' The agreement would extend full US civilian nuclear energy cooperation to New Delhi, denied access to nuclear technology since 1974 when it first tested a nuclear weapon and refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

US Congressional critics complain the agreement undermines international nuclear non-proliferation efforts and needs to be stricter. The Indian prime minister was seeking to allay speculation that Washington had been asking for more concessions and that New Delhi might give in to gain US civilian nuclear cooperation.

U.S. Trims Nuclear Material Stockpile
(Wade Boese, Arms Control Today)

December 2005
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman announced Nov. 7 that the United States would reduce by 200 metric tons the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiled for nuclear weapons. Once the decades-long process is completed, the United States would still retain hundreds of metric tons of this nuclear bomb-making material.

Nuclear weapons require plutonium or HEU to function. A typical U.S. nuclear weapon employs both, a plutonium primary and an HEU secondary.

The 200 tons of HEU, which Bodman said could produce 8,000 weapons, would be allocated for three different purposes. The largest portion, 160 metric tons, would be reserved for powering the U.S. Navy’s nuclear vessels, currently numbering 82 submarines and surface ships. Bodman claimed this move would postpone the need to build a new naval HEU fuel production facility for at least 50 years.

Fissile Facts
(Carnegie Analysis, Ben Bain)

Thursday, December 15
Number of kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) needed for a nuclear weapon: 15-25
Number of kilograms in global HEU stockpiles: 1,900,000
Number of countries with at least 1 kg of HEU: 53
Number of countries with at least one bomb’s worth (25kg) of HEU: 24
Number of countries with at least twenty bomb’s worth (500kg) of HEU: 12
Number of kilograms of HEU in civil power and research programs: 50,000
Number of civil research facilities that still have 20kg or more of HEU: 128

http://reuters.myway.com/article/20051217/...RAN-USA-DC.html


US, Europe step up planning on Iran


By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Faced with an increasingly hard line from Iran, the United States and Europe have stepped up planning for tougher diplomatic action should Tehran follow through on threats to resume critical nuclear activities, according to U.S. officials and European diplomats.

The U.S. and its European allies are seeking agreement among themselves on precisely when Iran's nuclear program will have progressed to the point that the matter should be taken to the U.N. Security Council and what kinds of sanctions might be pursued there, the officials and diplomats said.

Tehran insists it only aims to produce civilian nuclear energy. Allies say the program is to produce weapons.

Russia, which is building Iran's nuclear power plant at Bushehr in southern Iran, remains a serious impediment. The United States fears that weapons grade plutonium could be extracted from the Bushehr reactor once it goes on line.

The United States and major European nations -- Britain, France and Germany -- have long threatened to bring the issue to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

But negotiations appear at an impasse and new Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has alarmed the world with aggressive calls for Israel to be "wiped off the map."

"Increasingly, we feel the Iranians are just not interested in any sort of privately negotiated solution to this problem, that what they are interested in is a political confrontation over it," one European diplomat told Reuters.

Under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed, member states are guaranteed the right to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle but are banned from making weapons.

The Bush administration is under growing pressure from Congress and pro-Israel groups to soften its stance toward Tehran. They want the nuclear issue referred to the U.N. Security Council, where sanctions could be imposed.

U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph, who oversees nonproliferation issues, was in Europe this week for meetings that included discussions on Iran.

U.S. and European experts are to meet Iran next week to see if negotiations can resume, but the outlook is pessimistic.

"I think there are a lot of different pieces moving toward an interesting point on Iran, especially the nuclear piece," a U.S. official said.

A pro-Israel advocate said administration officials "are considering harder approaches. Things are moving on a faster track."

A second European diplomat said while there was a U.S. trend to "toughen the position" on Iran, some Europeans preferred to keeping trying to draw Russia into a unified position.

Efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program would suffer if the issue was moved to the Security Council and the council was too divided to take action, some analysts said.

U.S. officials say if the Security Council discussed Iran's nuclear program, sanctions would not be imposed immediately, while the council tried other diplomatic pressures.

WHERE IS THE 'RED LINE'?

Also under discussion is what the United States and other states would consider their "red line" -- the point at which Iran has crossed into a dangerous activity that cannot be tolerated.

"We cannot achieve anything until we are certain we see things the same way," the second European diplomat said.

Iran froze work at its Isfahan nuclear facility in late 2004 under a deal with Britain, France and Germany but resumed uranium conversion in August 2005.

Tehran has threatened to go further and begin uranium enrichment, the most sensitive part of the nuclear cycle. The United States, Britain, France and Germany generally agree any further steps would be unacceptable but Russia is more lenient, officials said.

PROLIFERATION NEWS
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
December 20, 2005

N. Korea Says to Build Light-water Nuclear Reactors
(Reuters)

Tuesday, December 20
North Korea plans to build its own light-water atomic reactors and develop two other reactors that can produce large amounts of fissile material to boost its nuclear capabilities, official media said on Tuesday. The comment from the North's official KCNA news agency comes amid a snag in six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes. It could further complicate an already difficult diplomatic process, diplomatic analysts said.

North Korea has not said before it plans to build relatively proliferation resistant light-water reactors (LWRs) but it has threatened to resume work on two graphite-moderated reactors (GMRs), which can produce large amounts of material for atomic bombs, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said by telephone.

Tortured Truths
(Carnegie Analysis, Joseph Cirincione)

Monday, December 19
Administration officials have settled on a standard answer to questions about their pre-war claims of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in Iraq: “much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong.” Both President George Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used this excuse in remarks on Sunday, December 18. This explanation ignores the central role senior officials had in creating, shaping and selecting the intelligence.

For example, on the eve of war the president said Iraq “has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.”

The intelligence agencies, however, never said the Iraqi regime had trained and harbored al Qaeda, and explicitly said it was unlikely that Saddam would transfer weapons to terrorists. The training claim came from a man tortured in Egypt. U.S. agents brought a suspected terrorist, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, to Egypt to be interrogated in January 2002. Under torture, he claimed that Iraq had provided training in explosives and chemical weapons to al Qaeda. U.S. intelligence officials doubted the credibility of his statements, including a detailed February 2002 DIA report conclusion: "it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers.” Still, the president and the vice-president repeatedly used these statements as “credible evidence” of an Iraq-al Qaeda link, never noting the agency doubts. In January 2004 al-Libi recanted all his claims and they have been withdrawn by the administration.



European Backlash
(Carnegie Analysis, Jill Marie Parillo)

Tuesday, December 20
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s demagoguery has triggered a strong European backlash that may produce the Western unity long lacking in negotiations with Iran. European leaders have denounced Ahmadinejad’s screeds against Israel and his denial of the Holocaust, linked them to deep suspicions of Iran’s nuclear program and begun talk of sanctions and other actions to force Iranian compliance with its treaty obligations.

EU-Iranian negotiations, set to begin December 21, will be the first time since August of this year that the EU (led by Britain, France and Germany) will hold direct talks with the Iranians. On August 5, the Europeans gave Iran a “Framework for a Long-term Agreement,” but negotiations stalled 3 days later when Iran restarted its uranium conversion program at Isfahan. Now, outrage in European capitals over Ahmadinejad’s remarks have increased concern over Iran’s failure to fully suspend its uranium enrichment program and allow full access to IAEA inspectors. European leaders have moved closer to the U.S. view of Iran and may be more willing to enact sanctions or move towards referral to the UN Security Council.



Diplomacy
(Gerald F. Seib and Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal - Opinion)

Saturday, December 17
For months, the U.S. has been trying to convince Iran that international patience with its nuclear program is running out. Next week, Iran may see just how true that is.

Iran meets Wednesday with America's three main European allies, France, Britain and Germany, for a showdown over the Iranians' nuclear program. Diplomats predict the session will almost certainly end in rancor. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad darkened the atmosphere ahead of the talks last week with his statement that the Holocaust is a "myth," only the latest of his declarations to raise international hackles.



China's Role in North Korea
(Jason Qian and Anne Wu, Boston Globe - Opinion)

Monday, December 19
The six-party talks created to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem have lost momentum again. All six parties agreed on a denuclearization statement in September, but when the United States started imposing sanctions on North Korean enterprises suspected of counterfeiting and money-laundering, Pyongyang declared that it would boycott future talks. With the two countries at odds again, the denuclearization agreement remains an empty promise, raising the question: Is this framework of six-party talks sustainable for achieving a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula?

The talks will be sustainable only if they create a negotiation model that can maximize the common denominator of regional security and stability. It is thus crucial for China to transform its role from a neutral mediator to a more assertive one that will be able to tame the two ''veto" parties -- Pyongyang and Washington -- and reorient the talks to the long-term interest of regional security and economic prosperity.



Saran to Visit US to Discuss India's N-plan
(Hindustan Times)

Monday, December 19
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran leaves for the US on Tuesday to discuss a plan to separate the country's civilian and military nuclear facilities in line with a bilateral nuclear cooperation pact.

The plan, if found credible by the US administration, will be presented to the US Congress and will prove crucial in facilitating civilian nuclear energy cooperation with Washington.

Contrary to fears expressed by vocal non-proliferation activists in the US, the Indian plan proposes to place a large number of civilian nuclear reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, diplomatic sources said.



Gulf States Show Concern at Iran's Nuclear Plans
(Brian Whitaker and Agencies, The Guardian)

Monday, December 19
Gulf Arab leaders yesterday discussed turning the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone amid growing unease over Iran's nuclear intentions.

"We trust Iran but we don't want to see an Iranian nuclear plant, which is closer in distance to our Gulf shores than to Tehran, causing us danger and damage," Abdul Rahman al-Attiya, secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, told reporters before the closed-doors summit meeting began. "This issue is very worrying, not just for the GCC but for the whole world," he said.

The GCC - an economic and security organisation which groups together the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar - is usually circumspect in its comments about its neighbour on the opposite shore of the Gulf, but last month it described Iranian nuclear ambitions for the first time as "a threat" that could "endanger global security".

Top Diplomat says Europe Must Concede Iran's Right to Nuclear Fuel Cycle
By VOA News
21 December 2005




Manouchehr Motakki
Iran is insisting that European negotiators meeting in Vienna acknowledge Tehran's right to develop a full nuclear fuel cycle.

The comment from Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Motakki was made Wednesday in Tehran, as European envoys met with their Iranian counterparts to explore the possibility of a new round of nuclear talks in January.

Diplomats from Britain, France and Germany are seeking guarantees that Iran will continue its suspension of its suspect uranium enrichment program. For its part, Tehran says Wednesday's talks should lead to the establishment of a timetable for the full resumption of nuclear fuel cycle work.

Wednesday's talks are the first contact between the two sides since August.

The United States alleges Iran's nuclear work is a cover for secret efforts to develop an atomic bomb. Tehran says its research is aimed at developing sources of electricity.

Some information for this report provided by AFP, AP and Reuters.

India Defends Nuclear Deal with U.S.
(Carol Giacomo, Reuters)

Wednesday, December 21
India on Wednesday defended a controversial new civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States and rejected demands by American critics that New Delhi accept curbs on its atomic weapons program.

Ahead of talks with senior U.S. officials, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said he was bringing "ideas" to address a centerpoint of the July 18 deal -- India's commitment to place nuclear facilities associated with its civilian energy program under international inspection.

But he declined to give details, including how India would treat its Canadian-supplied Cirus nuclear plant, which experts say was intended for peaceful use but was diverted for military purposes. "We are not talking here about a capping of India's strategic (nuclear weapons) program. We are not talking here about a fissile material cutoff" but about how to meet India's burgeoning energy needs, he told the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.

U.S. Congressmen Seek to Oppose India Nuclear Deal
(Reuters)

Wednesday, December 21
Two U.S. lawmakers have proposed a resolution expressing congressional disapproval for President George W. Bush's sweeping nuclear agreement with India, one of the congressmen said on Tuesday.

If the resolution passed, it would signal lawmakers' "disapproval" of the July 18 deal, which has generated strong opposition from non-proliferation advocates because it would give India access to previously banned technology.

"The administration's move to launch nuclear cooperation with India has grave security implications for South Asia and the entire world," said Democratic Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts, who introduced the resolution with Republican Rep. Fred Upton of Michigan last week.

Talks With Iran on Nuclear Plans Resume; Little Progress Is Seen
(Richard Bernstein, New York Times)

Thursday, December 22
Representatives of three European countries and Iran met Wednesday for the first time since negotiations over Iran's nuclear development program were suspended four months ago in bitterness. After five hours of closed-door meetings in Vienna, the delegates said the two sides had agreed to hold further talks in January.

The purpose of what European diplomats were calling "talks about talks" was to see if enough common ground existed for the stalled negotiations to resume next year.

North Korea’s Reactor Threat Puts Cloud Over Talks
(Song Jung-A and Guy Dinmore, Financial Times - UK)

Tuesday, December 20
North Korea said on Tuesday it planned to build light water reactors to meet its energy demands. Although the threat is unlikely to be carried out, it could further complicate the stalled six-party talks over Pyong-yang’s nuclear weapons programme.

North Korea is unlikely to have either the money or the technology to build the reactors, the fuel in which is much harder to convert into fissile material than traditional plutonium power plants.

However, the threat underlined the challenges facing the talks, which appear in danger of stalling amid disputes over energy and a US crackdown on alleged North Korean counterfeiting and money laundering.

China Punishes General for Talk of Strike at U.S.
(Reuters)

Thursday, December 22
A Chinese general has been punished for telling reporters that China could use nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. intervention in a conflict with Taiwan, military sources said Thursday.

Major General Zhu Chenghu received an "administrative demerit" recently from the National Defense University, which bars him from promotion for one year, said the sources, who requested anonymity.

" He misspoke," one source said. "But the punishment could not be too harsh or we would be seen as too weak toward the United States." An administrative demerit is the second lightest punishment on a scale of one to five, but still potentially damaging to an officer's career. The lightest is an administrative warning, while the heaviest is expulsion.

New Ballistic Missile Launched From Russian Nuclear Sub
(MosNews)

Wednesday, December 21
The Russian strategic nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoy successfully launched the new Bulava ballistic missile in the White Sea Wednesday morning.

The missile hit a target at the Kura firing range on the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian Navy’s Captain Igor Dygalo told Ekho Moskvy radio. “This was the first underwater launch of a Bulava missile and the second launch conducted as part of a series of tests of the missile,” he said.

The seaborne strategic missile system Bulava can carry at least 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads. Its effective radius is at least 8,000 kilometers.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria has signed a pact for the storage of Iran’s nuclear weapons and missiles – Jane’s Defense Weekly

December 21, 2005, 1:29 PM (GMT+02:00)

The Damascus-Tehran strategic accord is meant to protect both countries from international pressure over their banned weapons programs. Syria commits to allow Iran to “safely store weapons, sensitive equipment or even hazardous materials on Syrian soil, should Iran need such help in time of crisis” – namely UN sanctions. In January, 2003, DEBKAfile revealed that Syria provided a similar clandestine storage service for Saddam Hussein’s WMD.

The pact obliges Syria to continue to supply the Iranian-sponsored Hizballah with weapons, ammunition and communications. Iran has been the Hizballah’s leading arms supplier, filling out the 15,000 missiles and rockets the Shiite terrorist group has deployed along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Copyright 2000-2005 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.

http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=8304

December 24, 2005
Lump of Coal for Condi

by Gordon Prather
If Santa has been keeping a list, Secretary of State Condi Rice will be lucky to find even a lump of coal in her Christmas stocking.

Where on the list to begin?

On the Korean peninsula, where the South Korean National Security Council rebuffed Washington's contingency plan for taking military action against North Korea in the event Bush deemed it necessary because of "serious internal turmoil"?

Or at the Seventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons in April, wherein she refused to allow the findings of the Sixth RevCon to even be discussed, much less affirmed? And unsuccessfully attempted to get deleted all that language in the NPT that requires us to disarm and prohibits our nuking Iran?

Or with her unsuccessful attempt to unseat Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency?

Or with her unsuccessful attempts on three occasions to get the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for insisting on their "inalienable" right – guaranteed under the NPT and under their IAEA Safeguards Agreement – to produce their own fuel for their own nuclear power plants?

Then there were her unsuccessful attempts to get "free" elections in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Venezuela, Bolivia and elsewhere to come out the way Bush-Cheney wanted.

The list of her pyrrhic victories and humiliating [for us] defeats goes on and on.

But it is her Indian foray that may well have the most serious long-term consequences for us.

Condi had whizzed down to New Delhi to prevent India's finalizing technical and commercial contracts for a $4.5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India natural-gas pipeline that will provide Iranian natural gas mostly to India.

In return, Condi held out the possibility that the we would (a) lift sanctions imposed by Congress [as a result of the nuclear weapons tests India conducted in 1998] on India and on US companies doing business with India, ( supply India with the nuclear power plants that we had prevented Russia from supplying [and the fuel for them that we had prevented the Russians from supplying], and © get the Nuclear Suppliers Group to completely disregard guidelines on restrictions to be applied to NSG exports to India.

When details of what Condi had demanded of – and promised to – India leaked out, it very nearly brought down the Indian government. And may yet.

You see, President Bush had previously made a number of proposals which he said would strengthen the existing nuke proliferation-prevention regime.

He proposed expanding his Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict – on ground, sea or in the air – whatever he unilaterally deemed to be "illicit" transfers by "proliferation networks." He had urged the adoption of a Security Council resolution criminalizing whatever he deemed to be illicit international transfers.

Bush specifically urged the NSG to close what he alleged to be a loophole in the NPT by arbitrarily restricting export of uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing technology by NSG members to only those states already possessing them.

Established in 1975, the NSG is comprised of 44 nuclear-supplier states [including China, Russia, and the United States] that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon states.

NSG members are expected – but not, of course, required – to forgo nuclear trade with governments that do not agree to subject themselves to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards regime.

To be eligible for importing certain items from an NSG member, states – irrespective of whether they are NPT signatories or not – must have in place a comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreement covering all their nuclear activities and facilities.

Because India was not – and is not – an NPT-signatory, President Clinton had put great pressure on Russia to not construct the first two nuclear power plants at Koodankulam unless India subjected all its nuclear programs – peaceful and otherwise – to IAEA Safeguards. Russia [and India] successfully argued that the original contract was signed in 1988, before the new and more stringent NSG guidelines came into force in 1992.

Well, thanks to Condi-baby, Russia and India won’t have to make that argument, again, when it comes to constructing the remaining Russian nuclear power plants in India or providing fuel for them.

And what about the Iran-Pakistan-India multi-billion dollar natural gas pipeline?

According to the Indians, construction will likely begin next year. Last week Russia's Gazprom, the world's largest producer of natural gas, told the Indians that it is ready "to share the construction risks."

http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm...05&format=print

Monday, 26th December 2005
International

Mon 26 Dec 2005

Putin's show of strength triggers fear of fresh nuclear arms race
FRASER NELSON POLITICAL EDITOR
VLADIMIR Putin has sparked fears of a new arms race between Russia and the United States by deploying a nuclear ballistic strike force system that officials made clear could penetrate US anti- missile defences.

On Christmas Eve, the Russian army activated a new fleet of Topol-M missiles that can fit a nuclear warhead and travel 6,000 miles, changing trajectory to foil any enemy interception device.


The accompanying hawkish rhetoric of the Russian military commanders and the frenetic response of the US navy have stoked concern that the former Cold War adversaries have quietly resumed the arms race.

General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of the Russian missile forces, has mobilised a new battalion for the Topol-M missiles, which have a capacity for a one megatonne impact - 75 times the power of the 1945 Hiroshima bomb.

Gen Solovtsov, a critic of US anti- missile defence technology, said the Topol-M missile "is capable of piercing any missile defence system" and is immune to electromagnetic blasts used by current US anti-missile systems.

While Russia had disbanded two missile divisions last year, it has now formed more than 20 new units - in the fastest increase of nuclear spending since the run-up to the Cuban missile crisis.

Last month, the US navy carried out its most ambitious and successful test of an anti-missile interceptor, which can be launched from an Aegis class cruiser in the Pacific Ocean. A warhead from an incoming rocket was destroyed 100 miles above sea level - the first time an anti- missile defence has succeeded, in tests, when launched from a ship.

Duncan Lamont, a British defence analyst and editor of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, said the new Topol missiles could evade the "ballistic missile defences currently being fielded in Alaska and California".

The roll-out of the Topol-M and the hawkish accompanying language mark the fastest expansion of nuclear missiles since the SS-18 and Pershing II technologies were rolled out a generation ago.

Since the last US-Russia arms control treaty was signed in 1993 in Moscow, Russia has struggled to fund technology to replace its ageing defence system. The budget dried up as the Russian economy suffered.

But now the economy is flush with new oil wealth, the nuclear missile programme has been revived and was last month allocated a £1 billion budget increase from the Kremlin. This has boosted Mr Putin's popularity.

Japan, growing anxious about a nuclear missile strike from North Korea, signed up to the American missile defence programme last week and allocated £14 million for joint research.

The Ukrainian government, elected last year in a part-protest against Moscow's influence, has asked to come back under the former Soviet military umbrella and be protected by the Topol-M stationed in the Volga river.

In September, Russia successfully tested a Bulava missile, a submarine-launched equivalent of the Topol-M. Launched from the White Sea, it hit its target 30 minutes later on Kamchatka, in the opposite, Far Eastern side of Russia.

The escalation in missile defence will pose difficult questions for Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, who must soon decide whether to renew Britain's trident nuclear deterrent. The case for not doing so is largely based on the pacification of post-Soviet Russia.

Relations with Mr Putin have been increasingly strained, as western leaders have criticised his heavy-handed style, his imprisonment of political opponents and slow pace towards democratising the country.

The European Union has condemned Mr Putin's decision to sell anti-aircraft missiles to Iran, whose new president last month spoke of his desire to "wipe Israel off the map". Iran says it wants to buy Russian nuclear energy next.

Russia takes over the year-long G8 presidency from Britain in January. Mr Putin has made his theme security of energy supply - which marries concern over Iraq with the Kremlin's concerns about its control of Caspian oil reserves.

PROLIFERATION NEWS
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
December 27, 2005

Moscow's Uranium Enrichment Proposal Only Partially Suits Iran - MP
(RIA Novosti)

Tuesday, December 27
Russia's proposal on joint uranium enrichment is only partially acceptable to Iran, a member of the Iranian parliament said Tuesday. Ala'eddin Borujerdi, head of the Majlis national security and foreign relations committee, said Iran was willing to cooperate with Russia and other countries in the nuclear sector, but could not accept Russia's offer to host Iranian uranium enrichment facilities.

Borujerdi suggested that Tehran should try to convince Moscow that Natanz and other enrichment facilities across Iran were the best sites for collaborative projects.

On December 24, Moscow, which is assisting Iran in building a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, formally proposed to Tehran that the latter move its uranium enrichment facilities to Russian territory.



U.S. Puts Sanctions on Chinese Firms for Aiding Tehran
(Bill Gertz, Washington Times)

Tuesday, December 27
Several Chinese companies involved in selling missile goods and chemical-arms materials to Iran have been hit with U.S. sanctions, Bush administration officials said yesterday.

The sanctions cover six Chinese government-run companies, two Indian firms and one Austrian company, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

The penalties have been under consideration since April and were approved by Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick within the past several weeks. The sanctions were imposed under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which Congress passed in 2000 to deter international support for Iran's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and missile-delivery systems.



'Even If The Nuclear Deal Were To Be Deferred, US-India Relations Will Flourish'
(Interview with Leonard Spector, Rediff)

Tuesday, December 27
Leonard 'Sandy' Spector is one among a small group of top nuclear nonproliferation experts who have been briefing United States Congressional staffers, including those on the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the merits and demerits of the proposed US-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.

Spector is a former Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the US Department of Energy's National Security Administration, and currently Deputy Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Last fortnight he convened along with other leading nonproliferation experts convened a special briefing to talk about India's alleged transfer of plutonium from the Canadian-supplied CIRUS research reactor to its nuclear weapons programme to powerful lawmakers including Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Richard Lugar of the dangers inherent in the US-India nuclear deal. Spector told rediff India Abroad Managing Editor Aziz Haniffa that in his opinion, Lugar is aware of the issues and there is increasing concern on Capitol Hill over the deal.



N.Korea's Priority is Ties with U.S.-S.Korea
(Jon Herskovitz, Reuters)

27 December 2005
North Korea is more interested in establishing diplomatic ties with the United States than it is in receiving economic aid, a top South Korean official said on Tuesday.

North Korea agreed at six-country talks in September to dismantle its nuclear weapons programmes in exchange for economic aid, security assurances and greater diplomatic recognition, including the eventual normalisation of ties with Washington.

"I believe the most valuable thing that North Korea wants to get in return for abandoning its nuclear programmes is the normalisation of relations with the United States," Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told a news conference.



Democracy and Iran Tension to Test Russia's G8 Lead
(Reuters)

Tuesday, December 27
Moscow's tensions with the West over Iran's nuclear programme and its patchy record on democracy will test Russia's year at the helm of the G8 club of rich nations starting on Sunday.

With Tehran heading for a showdown with Western powers over their suspicions it is seeking nuclear arms, the Iran issue may also test the cohesion of the G8 under Russian chairmanship. Unconvinced by Western arguments, Moscow is still helping build Iran's first nuclear reactor and has blocked European Union moves to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council.



British Debate Replacement for Nuclear Force
(Rob Gurantz, Arms Control Today)

December 2005
Activists and politicians in the United Kingdom have begun debating whether and how to replace its nuclear weapons system, known as Trident. Parliament is expected to make a decision on the matter before the current parliament ends in 2010.

The United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal consists of four Vanguard submarines, each carrying 16 U.S.-supplied Trident long-range ballistic missiles equipped with up to three warheads. The Royal Navy deploys one submarine at a time, maintains its missiles on a reduced state of alert, and keeps them untargeted. This posture has been in place since 1998, when the United Kingdom reduced its number of deployed nuclear warheads by one-third and removed nuclear-armed aircraft from service. The United Kingdom, which became the third nuclear-weapon state in 1952, has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals among such states, with fewer weapons than France, Russia, or the United States.



Links of Interest:

The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea, Report by Joel Wit, Jon Wolfsthal, and Choong-suk Oh, Center for International & Security Studies, 16 December 2005

"British nuclear forces, 2005," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, November/December 2005


Carnegie Conference Featured Resources:

Utility of Nuclear Weapons
This panel was chaired by Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association.

Download a transcript of the panel by the Federal News Service
Download a rapporteur summary of the panel
Download Daryl Kimball's presentation

Download audio:

Part I: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association
Part II: General Eugene Habiger, University of Georgia
Part III: Henrik Salander, WMD Commission
Part IV: Frank Miller, The Cohen Group
Part V: Ivan Oelrich, Federation of American Scientists
Part VI: Question and Answer Session
Click here for more resources from the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference.


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Click here [or visit http://www.carnegieendowment.org/resources...?fa=newsletters] to go to the Newsletter signup page to subscribe or unsubscribe. For questions and comments, please contact proliferationnews@carnegieendowment.org.

http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8312

December 28, 2005
Nuking Iran With
the UN's Blessing
Only the American people can stop it
by Jorge Hirsch
In the "global war on terror," Iran is the next target, having been designated by the U.S. State Department [.pdf] as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism" in the world. The United Nations has given its blessing, and the U.S. will fill in the blanks.

Before we analyze this, however, let us ask ourselves: why not Florida instead? In fact, Florida should be way ahead on the list. Family considerations should not play a role in U.S. policy decisions.

Let's compare the cases. For Florida:


At least 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers had Florida connections.
Thirteen of the 19 were in Florida before Sept.11.
Eight of the hijackers took flying lessons in Venice, Fla.
Five of the hijackers trained in Florida gyms.
Two of the hijackers got drunk in a Hollywood, Fla. bar a few days before the attack.
Instead, the connections between 9/11 and Iran are much more tenuous, according to the 9/11 Commission:


"Senior al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives" in 1993.
"Iran facilitated the transit of al-Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and some of these were future 9/11 hijackers."
"We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack."
The 9/11 hijackers used planes, not explosives. So I very much hope that the Pentagon is revising its Nuclear Strike Plan. A precision-guided missile with a nuclear warhead – or a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb – should be effective in vaporizing both aboveground and underground facilities of Huffman Aviation School in Venice, Fla., with minimal collateral damage.

The fact is, terrorists do not need "state sponsors" to do their job. The 9/11 hijackers lived in the U.S., rented apartments, opened bank accounts, got drivers licenses, rented cars, took English lessons, had jobs, joined gyms, learned the needed flying skills, bought their box-cutter knives, and blew themselves up in the good old United States. And so will the next terrorists who strike us.

Furthermore, some of the 9/11 hijackers lived and studied in Hamburg, Germany. And they met in Madrid. So are Hamburg and Madrid next on the strike list?

Does anybody really believe that the "training camps" in Afghanistan played any significant role in 9/11? Can somebody please explain what exactly the 9/11 hijackers learned at those training camps that they couldn't learn elsewhere?

Does anybody really believe that the purported meeting, which in fact never took place, of Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague would have played a significant role even if it had taken place?

Yet we are embarked in a "global war of terror" in response to the 9/11 attacks that has led to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and is about to lead to a U.S. nuclear attack against Iran.

Because make no mistake, an aerial attack on Iran that will include low-yield nuclear bombs is the next step in the "global war on terror," unless something extraordinary happens to derail it.

The "Legal" Framework

The United States invaded Iraq under the pretext of enforcing UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1441. Bush stated in his address to the nation on March 17, 2003,

"On November 8th, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm."

Given that the U.S. was unable, despite strenuous efforts, to obtain a new resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force, Bush continued:

"These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it. … The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours."

The role of UNSCR 1441 for Iraq will be played by UNSCR 1540 for Iran.

UNSCR 1540

In preparation for the Iran strike, the U.S. in April 2004 proposed and the Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution against "the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery." The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN charter, which envisages the use of force to enforce resolutions (unlike resolutions adopted under Chapter VI, which deals with "pacific resolution of disputes"). "Affirming [the Security Council's] resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery," the resolution "decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery."

The United States accuses Iran of having a covert program to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It states,

"Iran has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC."
"Iran is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW infrastructure to include an offensive CW R&D capability."
And

"Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction."
The U.S. further accuses Iran of being the principal sponsor of terrorism in the world, of harboring al-Qaeda members, and of possible links to 9/11. The United States claims for itself the right to act preemptively ("[T]he United States cannot remain idle while danger gathers") and did so in invading Iraq. Well then?

You got it. The U.S. will claim the right under Chapter VII of the UN to enforce UNSCR 1540 by aerial bombing of Iran's nuclear and missile facilities ("means of delivery"), once negotiations between Iran and the European Union on Iran's nuclear program reach a stalemate.

This time, the U.S. will not even try to obtain explicit UN authorization to act, since it knows it is not in the cards. It didn't matter last time, so why bother now?

A supporting role will be provided by UNSC "anti-terrorism" resolution 1373, adopted after Sept. 11, also under UN Chapter VII. According to UNSCR 1373, "all States should prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens." It also decides that all states shall "[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists."

The United States and Israel accuse Iran of supporting and supplying weapons to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah.

There is, of course, a minor point to observe. Iran denies all these accusations, and the U.S. has not supplied proof for any of them. In a full-page ad published in the New York Times, Iran explains rather convincingly why it wants to enrich uranium and why it is not interested in pursuing nuclear weapons. In its report to the United Nations pursuant to UN resolution 1373 it details its efforts and laws to combat terrorism, and in its report for UN resolution 1455 (on al-Qaeda) it denies any connection with al-Qaeda. In its report to the UN pursuant to resolution 1540, it describes in detail its efforts for nonproliferation and reminds that it is a signatory to all international nonproliferation treaties and party to all international instruments banning WMD. Iran denies that it supports any terrorist activities anywhere and says that it only gives "moral support" to Hezbollah. While the United States and the European Union have labeled Hezbollah a terrorist organization, the United Nations has not, and it is certainly not regarded as such in the Muslim word. All of Iran's statements to the UN are ignored by the U.S., which states (without proof), that "Iran's pursuit of these deadly weapons, despite its adherence to treaties that ban them marks it as a rogue state, and it will remain so until it completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantles its WMD-related programs." Remember Iraq?

The fact is, resolutions 1540 and 1373 together with baseless accusations do not give the U.S. a right to attack Iran. However, bombing Iran under these resolutions is no different from invading Iraq under resolution 1441. Since the UN did not condemn the Iraq invasion after it happened (and even "blessed it" with resolutions 1483, 1500, 1511, and 1546), the U.S. can safely assume that it will do the same in this case.

Concerning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, as discussed in an earlier column, it is technically "legal" for the United States to do so. As stressed in U.S. documents [.pdf], "no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict." (This of course ignores an "Advisory Opinion" from the International Court of Justice). Since Iran was declared in "noncompliance" with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on Sept. 24, 2005, the "negative security assurance" issued by the U.S. to the UN in 1995 (UNSCR 984) promising to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states no longer applies to Iran.

The Practical Framework

Even if it is not "more illegal" to nuke Iran than it was to invade Iraq, we may still ask: (a) can it happen?, ( will it happen?, and © how will it all get started?

As discussed in previous columns, all the elements are in place so that it can happen. The main points:


The president alone (without consulting Congress) has authority to initiate an aerial attack against Iran's facilities under the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23 of 2001.
The president has sole authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, or to delegate that authority to others. This has always been U.S. policy.
There appears to be no one in the upper echelons of the Bush administration who would have any qualms about a preemptive aerial attack against Iran. In addition, among these top officials there are several who have a history of advocating the offensive use of nuclear weapons, and there is not a single one known to hold the opposing point of view.
So it is clear that it can happen. The answer to "will it happen?" is equally clear. There is a reason Iran was included in the "axis of evil" speech of 2001, and why there is so much administration rhetoric against Iran. Such talk has prepared the public for an attack. Very recent developments in relation with Turkey suggest that the time is drawing near. Turkey played an important role in the preparations for war against Iraq, and it appears to be playing a role again in the preparations for an Iran offensive.

Furthermore, the United States' stance with respect to Iran's nuclear ambitions is clearly designed to bring about a diplomatic impasse. The U.S. is not negotiating with Iran directly, and it emphasizes that it is not part of any possible compromise. Once a diplomatic stalemate is reached, does anybody believe that the U.S. will just sit back and watch Iran start to enrich uranium, or even continue reprocessing, after all the statements it has made that this is unacceptable? Can't you already hear the future words of our fearless leader on announcing the attack on Iran?

"I believe a president must confront problems and not pass them on to future presidents and future generations. I believe the most solemn duty of the American president is to protect the American people. If America shows uncertainty and weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy. This will not happen on my watch."

As for how it will all get started, there is room for speculation. One possibility is that Israel will pull the trigger, with a surprise (conventional) bombing of Bushehr and other facilities, which could "force" the U.S. to join in to protect Israel and U.S. forces in Iraq from Iranian retaliation. Recent statements by Israeli officials hint at this possibility, but it could be a smokescreen. Alternatively, Israel and the U.S. could attack jointly, or the U.S. could attack alone. This could be triggered by Iran resuming enrichment activities, or just by a Russian veto on measures against Iran at the Security Council. It is likely to be accompanied with some new U.S. "revelation" about Iran's alleged chemical/biological weapons programs and its alleged connections to terrorists. If the U.S. participates in the initial attack, it is likely to first give some kind of ultimatum to Iran, just as it gave an unacceptable ultimatum to Iraq. Unlike Israel, the U.S. still pretends to abide by some international norms of conduct and would not launch a surprise attack.

The ultimatum could be that Iran not only stop all uranium reprocessing and enrichment activities, but that it also destroy all its nuclear installations and missiles under U.S. and international supervision or face the possibility of an attack "at a time of our choosing." And even if Iran were to accept, the attack would not be averted, because disarmament is not the issue any more than it was in the case of Iraq. Recall that Iraq was not spared even after agreeing to destroy its missiles and doing so. It didn't help one bit.

Other possible scenarios that could get the process going include a terrorist act against Americans that the U.S. can blame on Iran; some major unrest in Iraq that the U.S. can blame on Iran; some new revelation of "classified information" that Iran is "threatening" the U.S.; or a Tonkin-Gulf-like incident.

Why Nukes Will Be Used

As discussed in previous columns, over the past several years the Bush administration has laid out a new Nuclear Posture for the United States that essentially guarantees that low-yield nuclear weapons will be used in the upcoming conflict with Iran. The essence can be summarized in the following statement in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf]:

"Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation."

In other words, the new Nuclear Posture has completely erased the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are now "integrated" with conventional weapons and will be used if they are militarily expedient. Given that there are a large number of underground targets in Iran to be destroyed, and that using nuclear bombs will be expected to deter Iran from responding with missiles and conventional forces to the U.S. attack, it is almost inconceivable that nuclear bombs would not be used.

Why isn't America worried sick about this possibility? There are three reasons.


People think that if the U.S. planned to do something as drastic as using nuclear bombs, there would be some advance warning. In fact, there has been, but it is subtle enough that it will only become clear after the fact. The code words are all our options. They have been used by the administration in connection with resolving the Iran situation, in connection with using nuclear weapons in response to WMD, and in connection with predicting future attacks on a state suspected of having WMD.
Most people associate nuclear bombs with enormous destruction, on the scale of Hiroshima or larger. Hence they find it inconceivable that the U.S. would use nuclear bombs against Iran or other non-nuclear nations. They don't realize that there are low-yield nuclear weapons (with yields as small as 1/1,000 of Hiroshima) and that the "nuclear hitmen" in the administration expect to use such "small" nuclear bombs against Iranian underground installations, causing little "collateral damage."
The few people who do realize that this may happen are not worried because they consider it to be in the best interests of the United States, as the nuclear hitmen do.
Why the Nuclear Hitmen Are Doing This

Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the other nuclear hitmen are not completely irrational nuts, nor are they completely stupid nor even completely evil. They sincerely believe that nuking Iran is in the best long-term interests of the United States and of the world, for the following reasons:

The New American Century

This vision of American's preeminent role in the world holds that "we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise." They realize there will be some "costs" in nuking Iran, but regard those costs as worth paying as part of achieving "America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles."

No Nuclear Threshold

In the minds of the nuclear hitmen, there seems to be no "threshold" for the use of nuclear weapons. This is evident from various documents and speeches. If a nuclear bomb will kill the same or a smaller number of people than a conventional bomb, it is equally usable or even preferable "[f]or rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms." There is absolutely no consideration given to the fact that nukes are a qualitatively different kind of weapon. "Use of nuclear weapons within a theater requires that nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest extent possible."

Nuclear Deterrent

On the other hand, the nuclear hitmen do realize that for much of the rest of the world there is a qualitative difference between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. Much of the world regards nuclear weapons as unusable except in the most extreme circumstances. This, however, presents a contradiction to the stated main goal of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal: to influence an adversary's actions. As the Nuclear Posture Review states:

"U.S. nuclear forces will now be used to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends. …Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities."

However, to "dissuade" and "deter," the nuclear option has to be credible, and if most people believe there is a sharp nuclear threshold and nuclear weapons are unusable, it follows that nuclear weapons are useless to dissuade and deter. The value of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to dissuade and deter adversary actions that do not involve an existential threat to the United States needs to be established, since it has no credibility. That is what nuking Iran will achieve, and that is why the nuclear hitmen believe it is a worthy goal.

The Bush Legacy

Every president naturally longs to leave a worthy and lasting legacy. None of Bush's actions so far is likely to be regarded as worthwhile in the future: quite the opposite. History is likely to judge his performance harshly and in particular significantly worse than his father's, especially if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate. However, there is no question that crossing the nuclear threshold for the first time in 60 years will change the world and overshadow all the other actions of this administration. To the extent that Bush believes such an action to be in the long-term interests of the United States, for the reasons outlined above, it is unlikely he would want to defer this "honor" to a future president, and particularly not to his kid brother.

The Consequences of Nuking Iran

It is arguably possible that the nuclear hitmen's most optimistic expectations will be realized: the U.S. will succeed in crossing the nuclear threshold by using a few low-yield nuclear bombs against Iranian installations, without resulting in significant escalation, and achieve its goals of destroying Iran's military capabilities and establishing the value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It is also certainly possible, and in my view much more likely, that the results will be disastrous, as follows:


(1) A very large number of people will die.
For most of the world, the use of nuclear weapons is a major qualitative step, even if the yield and destruction of the nuclear weapons used is the same or less than that of conventional weapons. As a consequence, this action is likely to bring about an "irrational" reaction from Iran. No U.S. threat will deter Iran from retaliating any way it can – by firing all its missiles and launching a massive invasion of Iraq with millions of poorly armed but determined Basij militia. The U.S. will "have to" respond with large-scale bombing, including with nuclear bombs, causing potentially hundreds of thousands of Iranian casualties. This is likely to cause an immediate, large upheaval in the Middle East, with unforeseeable consequences. These events are not likely to be forgotten by the 1 billion-large worldwide Muslim community.

(2) America will be a pariah state.
The administration hopes that the use of nuclear bombs in this conflict will be viewed as "unavoidable" to save lives, ours and theirs. The world will not buy that interpretation. A cursory search on the Internet today makes it clear that it is already widely believed that the upcoming nuking of Iran is an event planned by the Bush administration (e.g., the Philip Giraldi story). Disclosures that will surely come after the fact will make this premeditation even more evident (like the Downing Street memos in the case of Iraq). The planned use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state in the name of nuclear nonproliferation, based on false accusations and concocted scenarios, will not be condone