From: Winslow Wheeler [mailto:winslowwheeler@comcast.net]
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2006 10:59 AM
To: winslowwheeler@comcast.net
Subject: Missing the Point on Baker/Hamilton

The former adviser to Senator Gary Hart, William S. Lind, and the former Reagan Pentagon official, Lawrence Korb, come from very different political perspectives (which have evolved well away from their original home bases). Nonetheless, they essentially agree on the real role of the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group and what the White House is now failing to appreciate: that the Iraq Study Group is the last train for America out of an Iraq that does not descend into even greater chaos. They explain in two commentaries that appeared separately at the websites for AntiWar.com and The National Review Online.

Missing the Opportunity

The following two editorials appeared on separate websites. The first article, "On War #196: Knocking Opportunity" by William S. Lind appeared on AntiWar.Com on Dec. 11, 2006. The second editorial "The Iraq Study Group's unsatisfying recommendations" by CDI Senior Adviser Lawrence Korb appeared on The National Review Online on Dec. 6, 2006.

Editorial #1:"On War #196: Knocking Opportunity"
By William S. Lind
AntiWar.Com
Dec. 11, 2006

Last week, the Iraq Study Group Report burst upon a breathless world, and proved to be an empty piñata. None of its recommendations has the slightest chance of reversing the course of the war in Iraq. Only those who just got into town on the last truckload of turnips expected anything more. All Washington “Blue Ribbon Commissions” are part of the kabuki, intended to fool the rubes back home into thinking something real is happening, when it isn’t.

If the Iraq Study Group Report is empty of content, the responses to it from the war hawks, or more accurately at this point the war vultures, since what they are feeding on is dead, were as clueless as a Marine at a meeting of Mensa. They denounced it as impracticable, which is true; as fanciful, in thinking Iran or Syria has any reason to help us in Iraq, which is also true; and, in the case of Senator John McCain, as a recipe for defeat.

Senator McCain almost got it right. The Iraq Study Group Report is not a recipe for defeat, but an acknowledgment of defeat. Therein lies its value, and its function. It offers the Bush administration the bi-partisan fig leaf it needs to cover its defeat in Iraq and our inevitable withdrawal.

Like all reports of Blue Ribbon Commissions, the Report of the Iraq Study Group is written so as to cover the backsides of its members. It does not come right out and say, “We’ve lost, and its time to get out.” The Letter from the Co-Chairs begins, “There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.”

After this obligatory tip of the cap to Pollyanna, however, the report lays it out as clearly as Washington ever will. The Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq concludes on page 32.

Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for their own future…The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.

Short of concluding with a chorus of “Asleep in the Deep,” it would be hard for the Study Group to make the reality of the situation more evident.

Again, what is key is not the details of the report or the viability of its recommendations, but the response to it. Had it the slightest understanding of which end is up, the Bush White House, while politely disagreeing with some details of the report, would have accepted it as “the only way forward.” The vultures, led by the neo-cons, would have “sadly concurred.” The Joint Chiefs’ strings would have been pulled so they saluted and “got on board” the last train out of Baghdad.

It might have gone somewhat like this: According to the Friday, December 8 Washington Slimes:

Yesterday afternoon, less than twenty-four hours after the release of the Iraq Study Group Report, President George W. Bush, accompanied by Iraq Study Group Co-Chairmen James A. Baker and Lee Hamilton and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, said, “While I do not agree with every detail of the Study Group’s Report, I accept that it represents the only way forward in Iraq that will have bi-partisan support of the Congress and the American people. I therefore accept its recommendations as a package, as Secretary Baker has described them, and pledge this administration to their speedy implementation.”

“I now call on all members of Congress of both parties to join the administration and the members of the bi-partisan study group to set aside all divisions and work together. I look forward to having all American combat troops home from Iraq early in 2008.”

President Bush was immediately followed by Mr. Baker, Mr. Hamilton and General Pace adding their endorsements to the administration’s new course and calling for an end to partisanship and national division over the war in Iraq.

Instead, as we know, the Bush administration and the vultures have rejected the fig leaf the Iraq Study Group Report offers. Determined to achieve “victory in Iraq,” they guarantee that America’s defeat will be naked before all the world.

One member of the study group, former Democratic Congressman Leon Panetta, was quoted in the Sunday, December 10 Washington Post as saying, “I think the feeling was, how do you rescue this administration from the grip of ideology and force it to face the real world?”

The Bush administration’s only desire, unfortunately for the country, is to escape the grip of reality and immerse itself more deeply in the Jacobin ideology of neo-cons. It seems that, absent a miracle, we are doomed to wander in Oz for two more years.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

Editorial #2: "The Iraq Study Group's unsatisfying recommendations. Half-Baked"
By Lawrence Korb
The National Review Online
Dec. 6, 2006

Today's recommendations from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group--which many in Washington hoped would furnish a panacea for our problems in Iraq--are a good first step in helping this nation extricate itself from the quagmire there. But they are only a first step. In truth, they do not go nearly far enough to get us out of the mess that the Bush administration has created.

The group confirms that the situation in Iraq is grave (and deteriorating) and that there are no good options. These are things that any objective observer has known for more than two years--and things that both the current and future secretary of defense now acknowledge. But they are truths now spoken only because the advent of the commission made them speakable--and they are still not acknowledged by the president.

The group, led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, also recognizes, correctly, that our best hope for easing the situation is to pressure the Iraqi government to make the painful political compromises necessary to create a nation that all of its citizens--regardless of their sect or tribe--are willing to fight and die for. (These compromises include protecting minority rights, balancing the powers of the central and provincial governments, and sharing the oil revenue equitably.) It also recognizes that we must engage all of the nations in the region, including Syria and Iran, in a dialogue on the future of Iraq--as well as the other problems in the region. And it links the situation in Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis by suggesting that we must get engaged in that situation, something Brent Scowcroft noted in August 2002, when he argued that regional powers were more concerned about this than about Saddam Hussein.

But it falls short on exactly how to implement its suggestions. The proposal that we threaten to withdraw troops and financial support if Nouri Al Maliki's government does not meet certain benchmarks is not strong enough. The report merely says that, if Iraqis do not meet the benchmarks, we could withdraw--not that we should by a specific date. In fact, to put real pressure on Maliki, we must begin to withdraw under a fixed timetable. If the Iraqi leadership knows we will be gone by a specific date, it will know that, if it hasn't made the necessary compromises by then, it will have to deal with the consequences alone.

Since the Iraqis took control of the government in June 2004, we have been pressuring them to modify the constitution and disband the militias--to no avail. This is because President Bush has been saying for more than a year ago that, when "Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Yet, with more than 300,000 trained Iraqi security forces, we have more troops in Iraq than we did when Bush first made that statement. Meanwhile, since the election of the Iraqi parliament last December, approximately twelve battalions' worth of soldiers and Marines have been killed or wounded, and, in that time, Iraq's elected officials have done nothing to begin unifying their country.

Another problem is the Baker-Hamilton group's suggestion that we change our mission from combat to training; this misses an essential point. The problem with the 300,000 Iraqi security forces is not training: It is motivation. After all, we are not asking them to take on a major military power, but a group of some 20,000 insurgents. And what they need to do is essentially police work, not major conventional combat. No amount of expertise U.S. soldiers can impart will make the Iraqis any more likely to confront these insurgents.

Finally, by not setting a date for a complete withdrawal of all of our military forces, we embolden the insurgents (and their supporters), because they see us as occupiers who will never leave. Nearly 80 percent of the Iraqis believe that our presence is fueling the violence, and 60 percent think it is acceptable to kill Americans. And, what's more, without a complete withdrawal, we will not get the help we need from the countries in the region.

In a way, the Baker-Hamilton group--which is being hailed as landmark--painted an even grimmer picture than it intended: Not only are its own solutions insufficient to restore stability in Iraq, but even its canniest suggestions are likely to be ignored.

Lawrence Korb , a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information, served as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information @ www.cdi.org/smrp
202 797-5271 in DC
301 840-8992 in MD
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winslowwheeler@comcast.net