Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2006 8:31 PM
Subject: Fw: A Retired General's Opinion]

ot sure who added this comment in blue - General Melvin Zais was the commanding general of the 101st Airborne in Vietnam, apparently the father of Dr. Mitchell Zais

Larry


This is really worth reading. It was sent to me from a company commander of mine in Viet Nam. Our Commanding General at the time is the father of Dr. Mitchell Zais
BG U.S. Army (Retired)

I suspect he is related to MG Zais of 101st Airmoble in '69 - Andrew

/US Strategy in Iraq/ Honors Convocation
Newberry College 9 November 2006

Mitchell Zais http://www.newberry.edu/about/president.asp

Many of our faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would take this opportunity, two days before Veterans Day, to provide you with some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as the Commanding General of US and allied forces in Iraq. I also served as Chief of War Plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs, including a fellowship at the National Defense University. So while it's true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed.

This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won't talk about what the next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other talks. For today I'm going to focus on strategy

Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.

It's important that you understand what strategy is. In military terminology there is a distinction between strategy, operations, tactics, and techniques.

_Strategy_ pertains to national decision-making at the highest level. For example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the nation, then defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific, then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies in order to make them future allies.

An example of an_ operational_ decision from World War II would be the decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and Southern France before moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in Northern France or Belgium.

_Tactics_ characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery.

A_ technique_ might describe a way of employing machine guns with overlapping fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock.

Our strategy in Iraq has been:

1. fight the war on the cheap;

2. ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American government;

3. inconvenience the American people as little as possible, and

4. continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting.

No wonder the war is not going well.

_Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap._

From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of â?ouse massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,â?� his goal has been â?ouse no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology.â?�

Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, Eric Shinseki, testified before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia where he worked to disengage the warring factions of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Kosovars.

Shinseki also had available the results of a wargame conducted in 1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops on the ground were needed to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed.

Because of his testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved Shinseki aside. In a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled from active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small number of troops.

The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplished their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall from Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end-strength of the active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.

When I was commissioned in 1969 the Army was one and a half million. Despite the fact that we're engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Philippines, and committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army is now less than one third that size. We had more soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf war than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has soldiers.

As late as 1990, Army end-strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer than a half-million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add nearly 200,000 soldiers to the active ranks.

Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than 10,000 soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third
12-month tour of duty.

Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For Marines it's normally six months. For Air Force personnel it's typically four months. So when a soldier says he's going back to Iraq for his third tour, it means something totally different than when an airman says the same thing.

Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national debate and no input from Congress.

We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded the rebuilding of the Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces. The e-mails I receive from soldiers and Marines assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of their inadequate resources because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest priority.

We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or a worn out in combat. You've all read the stories about soldiers having to purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix equipment. For example, nearly 1500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in Texas with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama.

Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense budget of 3.8% of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy administration it averaged 9% of GDP. The average defense budget in the post Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8% of GDP. If we are in a global war against radical Islam, and we are, then we need a defense budget that reflects wartime requirements.

_A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions that are more appropriate for other branches of government._

Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to these activities as nation-building. Our soldiers and Marines are neither equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not what they do well and what only they alone can do.

But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What's the role of our Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial system? Where is the US Information Agency in establishing a modern equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These other US government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved in Iraq.

Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American government is at war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not.

_A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as little as possible._

Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not a war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war.

_A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are doing the fighting._

This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq.

Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines because he believes technological leaps we'll render ground forces obsolete. He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed this belief.

For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a non-existent enemy Air Force.

But, for pilots like Rumsfeld, war is all about technology. It's computers, it's radar, and it's high tech weapons. Technologists have a hard time comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates the death of her son in such a way. It's difficult for them to understand that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more than one generation. It's hard for them to accept that for young men with little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives.

But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by
25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old soldiers carrying rifles, in a dangerous and alien environment, where you can't tell combatants from noncombatants, Shiites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom seeking Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical. It's dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error.

In essence, our strategy has been produced by men whose view of war is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces which motivate them. They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land and a hostile people you need soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the mud, and lots of them.

In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits, not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning Defense Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this war.

The US military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current situation in Iraq.

But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope of the American government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit, and come home. But, what we have now is not a real strategy, it's business as usual.



.


Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D.
President

Dr. Mitchell (Mick) M. Zais has been president of Newberry College since August of 2000. He earned an Engineering Degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; a Master of Arts degree in military history from the School for Advanced Military Studies at Leavenworth, Kansas; and Master of Science and Ph.D. degrees in social psychology and organizational behavior from the University of Washington. He is also a graduate of the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., where he was a post-doctoral research fellow in national security affairs.

Dr. Zais has been appointed by Governor Mark Sanford to represent the state's 20 private colleges and universities on the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Newberry Opera House Foundation, the Lutheran Education Conference of North America, and the Southeastern Region of Thrivent Financial for Lutherans. He also represents the State of South Carolina in the Southern Region Education Board and serves as the Chairman of the Lieutenant Governor's Advisory Council on Aging.

Dr. Zais has written and published extensively in the fields of organizational behavior, curriculum design, stress, military history and doctrine, and leadership and management, in such professional journals as the Journal of Applied Psychology, Armed Forces Journal International, Military Review, Parameters, etc. His opinion-editorial pieces, written while President of Newberry College, have appeared in newspapers across the state.

Before becoming Newberry College's 20th president, Dr. Zais served his country for over 30 years as an officer in United States Army, attaining the rank of brigadier general. As an assistant professor at West Point, he taught management consulting, organizational behavior, and leadership. He has also served as an internal management consultant to the Army.

A paratrooper and Ranger, Dr. Zais served in a wide variety of infantry units, in Vietnam, the United States, and Korea. He commanded two rifle companies, an infantry battalion, a light infantry brigade, and served as deputy commanding general, Fort Riley, Kansas. His staff experience is primarily in military plans and operations, having worked as chief of operations, plans, and training for an infantry battalion and division; war plans officer for a corps; and Chief of War Plans for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dr. Zais was a White House aide and served in Panama as executive assistant to the four-star commander of all U.S. forces in Central and South America. In Kuwait, he was commanding general of U.S. and Allied forces. He also served as commanding general of Operation Provide Refuge, the task force that cared for the 4000 Kosovo refugees who entered the United States. Prior to coming to Newberry College, Zais was the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, the headquarters that administers the 184,000 part-time Reservists, 9,000 civilian employees, and 11,000 full-time military members of the Army Reserve.

Dr. Zais's military awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the Ranger, Airborne, and Combat Infantryman's Badges, and the South Carolina Meritorious Service Medal.

His wife, the former Susan Fincher, a graduate of the University of South Carolina, is from Columbia. Newberry College's first graduate, James E. Houseal, class of 1869, is Susan's great-great-great uncle. Her great-great grandfather, William Houseal, founder and editor of the Newberry Observer, received an honorary degree from Newberry College in 1916. The Zaises have two children; Bradley (20) and Ashley(18).

GENERAL (RET) MELVIN ZAIS, U.S. ARMY
General Zais's picture.

General Melvin Zais, a native of Fall River, Massachusetts, graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 1937 with a Bachelor of Art in Political Science. He began his military career after graduation as a U.S. Army Reserve Second Lieutenant.

He was recalled to active duty in 1940 after a year in civilian life and served at Fort Benning, Georgia where he volunteered for the original paratroop battalion in the Army, the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion.

After graduation from the Command and General Staff College in 1943, General Zais organized and trained the 3rd Battalion, 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and led them into combat in Italy and France. Service as Regimental Executive Officer during combat in Belgium and Germany was followed by command of the Regiment upon its return to Fort Bragg.

General Zais was selected as Brigadier General on June 1, 1964. Between 1964 and 1966, he became Deputy Commanding General, Field Force and Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. His second tour in Vietnam was served as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and XXIV Corps during the period of July 1968 to June 1970. He assumed command of the Third United States Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia in June 1972 which position he held until June 1973. He was named Commanding General, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Europe, Turkey, effective August 1973 following his promotion to General on July 13th the month prior.

His military decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal on five occasions; the Silver Star twice; the Legion of Merit four times; the Distinguished Flying Cross twice; the Bronze Star Medal; the Joint Service Commendation Medal; the Army Commendation Medal twice; the Purple Heart; and numerous foreign awards and honors.

General Zais had two sons with Marjorie Aileen Emert Zais, Barrie E. and Mitchell M. Zais both of whom are officers in the United States Army. Marjorie Zais passed away and General Zais subsequently married Patricia V. Light at Fort Myer, Virginia, becoming the stepfather of David R. and John P. Light.


Op/Ed piece by an experienced writer on Terrorism and the Military
THE MAN WHO WOULDN'T LISTEN
THE FAILURE OF DON RUMSFELD
Slideshow image
He always knew better - even when he didn't: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at a one of his classic Pentagon briefings.


November 12, 2006 -- AT the climax of "Barton Fink" - the best film ever made about a writer - the protagonist's world literally goes up in flames. Bewildered, the self-absorbed playwright asks a homicidal killer why disaster had to fall on him.

"Because," the murderer tells him, "you don't listen."

In Washington, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was the man who wouldn't listen.

Facing war, he dismissed the advice of those who had dedicated their lives to uniformed service, favoring civilian advisers who (to quote one observer's description of the attitude) had been "too important to waste their time in the military."

Confronted by grave threats from religious fanatics, he ignored the counsel of intelligence personnel who had met them face to face.

Tasked to create a democracy in the Middle East, he brushed off both the complexity of the region and the challenges of democracy.

Rumsfeld always knew better.

When the professional views of senior officers, such as the Army's General Eric Shinseki, conflicted with his pre-determined agenda, Rumsfeld sidelined them. When the blood-stained evidence suggested the need for more troops in Iraq and in our ground forces overall, he denied the facts. And when his refusal to let the military plan for an occupation of Iraq proved disastrous, he pretended that everything was going according to the plan that didn't exist.

Ignoring the rule that loyalty is a two-way street, Rumsfeld broke Pentagon morale early on. He disdained the Army as hidebound, then sought to take credit for the reforms the Army had initiated before he took office. He believed that the Marines were an anachronism, that technology would win the wars of the future and that everything that didn't shoot could be outsourced. (In Iraq, he even approved outsourcing security - and rogue mercenaries did more damage to our efforts to win the population's allegiance than any military misstep.)

Intending to cut the Army by at least two divisions and to trim the Marine Corps to free up more money for "transformation" - a code-word for funneling money to favored contractors - he insisted on a war plan for the invasion of Iraq that was supposed to prove that ground forces were no longer vital to winning the nation's wars.

Yet, after his vaunted "shock and awe" air campaign collapsed and the Army and Marines had to fight their way - magnificently - to Baghdad the old-fashioned way, Rumsfeld still refused to increase the size of our ground forces, arguing that it would take two to three years to "stand up" new units.

Well, here we are, three years later - still painfully short of the boots needed on the ground. The Army and Marines, ever dutiful, are stretched thin, and fight on with battered equipment.

When his non-plan for the reconstruction of Iraq failed - when the Iraqis refused to behave as he and his deputies insisted they would - Rumsfeld froze like a deer in the headlights. He never learned from our setbacks and, 31/2 years into this struggle, the Pentagon still doesn't have a strategy to win in Iraq.

Rumsfeld tried to improvise cheap solutions to the challenges posed by the most implacable enemies our country has ever faced. Religious fanatics though they be, the terrorists displayed a better grip on strategic reality than Rumsfeld ever did.

Proclaiming he'd gotten an obstreperous military "under control," he was in the position of a hospital administrator who, as patient deaths soar, proudly insists he's put those worthless doctors and nurses in their place.

A talented, experienced man, Rumsfeld should have been a first-rate secretary of Defense. Instead, he was failing in the job by the late summer of 2001. 9/11 saved him. Thereafter, our country and our military paid the price as his arrogance astonished even longtime Washington residents (and D.C. is not a city of the meek and humble).

When the military succeeded, he rushed for the microphones to preen. When things went awry, he let military officers handle the questions. He never admitted he was wrong. And he was wrong with remarkable consistency.

One man's vanity undercut Iraq's chances, squandered American lives, broke faith with our troops and badly damaged our military. He was anxious to go to war, but unwilling to fight. Instead of leading, he interfered with those capable of leading. He micro-managed our troops, disrupting small-unit deployments and overruling officers during combat, but couldn't manage our enemies. Those in uniform felt that he disdained them.

Ultimately, Donald Rumsfeld did the impossible: He made Vietnam-era Defense Secretary Robert McNamara look good.

Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer.

Thanks, Snuff.

This is a really good piece.

Even though many of us thought the decision to invade Iraq was wrong, it still could have been a success had Rummy listened to the advice given from people in the know.

But Rummy always new better.

20/20 hindsight is great, ain't it?

20/20 listening is better.

Unless you know everything.

Couldn't agree with the author more, although a little heavy handed and personal on Rumsfeld.... He has some very strong points..... Two of which hit home for me:

The bit about the American Public not being bothered.... Coming back state side I'm I stranger here, short of watching the evening news I doubt few here have ponied up a care package... no ones rationing food, fuel or electricity, Wall street mavracks are still racking in kings bonuses. Wally mart is full, people are cruizing in nice shinny Hummers.

It's like an alternate universe or a bad episode of the twilight zone.

I most definently beleive that their are other agencies better suited to building Schools setting educational guidelines, government policy, oversite, assisting with Infrastructure projects and judiciary work then your run of the mill grunt... but I have to say I learned a great deal.

My 2 cents

Wow, deja vu...sounds like you did learn brother...
try not to laugh when those who don't have a clue
look straight into the TV camera, pound their fist
and preach how we can turn Iraq into South Dakota.

Glad you made it. And, if you haven't moved into a National Forest
as a recluse, you are adapting very well. Turn on the Home Shopping
Network for laughs to avoid GW promoting illegal immigrants
getting Social Security (and many Democrats nodding "yes" as fast as they can).

Fact is, Americans are out to lunch, and their wide a*s*ses prove it.

You can't build a school in a war zone.

Even if it were already built, no Iraqi parent dares to send a child off to it. That child might never return home.

As for sacrifice, Bush told us to go shopping.

After all, we are no longer citizens... we are consumers.

Ah... right "war zone". You can build and or reconstruct schools in Iraq and we did plenty. Parents do send their children to school most of which had an armed guard at the entrance gate. One thing that is universal for all parents is to want a better life for their kids.... school is a part of that.

If Bush told you to shop.... who am I to question. BAHHHHHH BAHHHHHH

South Dakota I ain't never been there they tell me it's nice. Some day's I feel like I'm Truman; from the Truman show... member that movie about the guy whos hole life was on TV and it was really just a stage.

The crap folks worry about here "don't mean nothing" and the difference in politicans amounts to arguing over the color of sh!t.

Peace.

I know exactly what you mean 1stSgt, I see topics and discussions about stuff that don't mean nothing. We got people who if it bashes a politician from the other party it's got to be good. Well, I don't think they realize it but all it does is make them look like a kool aide swigging politico. Someone needs to pop them on the butt with a 2x4 and tell them to go live in the real world for a while.