It's been leaked in D.C. that Iraq Commanding General Casey will be out when President Bush speaks
this coming week and Major General David H. Petraeus will be the new C.O.

So, since I was the one on this board dissing Casey the most, I guess I should look at MG DP:

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles.../31petraeus.htm

In his 27 months in Iraq, Petraeus has been asked to lead a division into battle, to oversee the reconstruction and governance of Iraq's third-largest city, and to build up, from virtually nothing, Iraq's Army and police force. As Petraeus's varied roles show, Iraq has deeply challenged the soldiers who serve there, sometimes forcing them to perform duties far different from those they trained for. As a result, the Army has come to believe that teaching its soldiers how to think is as important as teaching them how to fight. "There is a very clear recognition of the importance of fostering flexibility and adaptability in leaders," says Petraeus.


http://usacac.army.mil/cac/commander.asp

He commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), leading the Screaming Eagles in combat during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His command of the 101st followed a year deployed on Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia, where he was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization Force and the Deputy Commander of the US Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Bosnia. Prior to his tour in Bosnia, he spent two years at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, serving first as the Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 82nd Airborne Division and then as the Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps.

Lieutenant General Petraeus was commissioned in the Infantry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1974. He has held leadership positions in airborne, mechanized, and air assault infantry units in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States, including command of a battalion in the 101st Airborne Division and a brigade in the 82nd Airborne Division. In addition, he has held a number of staff assignments: Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army; service as a battalion, brigade, and division operations officer; Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; Chief of Operations of the United Nations Force in Haiti; and Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lieutenant General Petraeus was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Class of 1983. He subsequently earned MPA and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and later served as an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the US Military Academy. He also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University.



Awards and decorations earned by General Petraeus include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, two awards of the Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal for valor, the State Department Superior Honor Award, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, and the Gold Award of the Iraqi Order of the Date Palm. He is a Master Parachutist and is Air Assault and Ranger qualified. He has also earned the Combat Action Badge and French, British, and German Jump Wings. In the fall of 2005, he was recognized by the U.S. News and World Report as one of America’s 25 Best Leaders.

Petraeus is the commanding general of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division, known as the "Screaming Eagles," and was based in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from April 2003 to February 2004. Petraeus and the approximately 18,000 soldiers under his command moved into northwestern Iraq in late April, and in early May presided over Iraq's first postwar elections. Having launched some 4,500 reconstruction projects and used tough military tactics to quell security threats, Petraeus had the kind of success in and around Mosul that Washington had hoped for, making Mosul a showcase for visiting congressmen.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sh...s/petraeus.html

This interview was conducted by FRONTLINE producer Martin Smith on Nov. 23, 2003.

Gen.: We could either fill the vacuum completely ourselves -- in which case, over time, it would be increasingly more difficult to extricate ourselves from running everything. Or we could start the process of getting Iraqis involved in self-government and filling that vacuum.

The sooner you get an Iraqi face on things, the better off you are. So we started down the road of getting an election going. We did that on May 5, elected a province council here in Nineveh province. That, in turn, elected the province governor. Frankly, we've been very, very fortunate in those individuals, the skills that they brought, the representation of the population of Nineveh province and what they've done for the new Iraq.

You have to remember that, not only did the Iraqis not understand democracy and the philosophy, if you will, of democracy -- and political philosophy in general, because they haven't been allowed to even discuss these things in universities and schools and the other places where normally that kind of dialogue would be ongoing -- not only did they not know that in general, they certainly don't know in particular what shape and size and form democracy should take for Iraq, either at the national or the local or regional level. And that's what they're working out. These speeches are very helpful in that regard. They're debates, basically. The truth won't be found in any one of these single speeches, but probably in that dialogue or debate among them. ...
...
I think we have to make sure that before we leave there is a stable, self-sustaining government and economy and all the other pieces in place, so that that does not happen.


PBS: What is your assessment as to how long that would take?

I honestly don't know. Every part of Iraq is different. We have made great progress here in terms of a host of very, very important areas, such as border police. Several thousand of them are trained, equipped, and on the border, doing a very good on the Syrian border in particular, which is one of great concern to a lot of people, and we're among them.


PBS: It's, indeed, incredibly impressive, the number of projects that you have running. I sat in on the evening briefing, and we recorded that with our cameras. It's almost an overwhelmingly complex job, managing all of that. But, yet, there it all is. In a half an hour, you get an overview of all that's going on.

Gen.: We think of this as getting the cattle to Cheyenne. I use this metaphorical image. We're all outriders out there, and what we have is all these large number of tasks -- that's the herd, that's all the cattle -- a whole bunch of individual, hundreds if not thousands of projects at any given time ongoing that we're trying to complete. So we're trying to keep the cattle herd, keep it all just going in the right direction. Every now and then, one will fall behind, or we'll lose track of it, or it'll take a wrong turn. If it's important, we'll go back and get it. We'll send an outrider, a battalion or brigade commander will get it back in tow and carry on with it. We're trying to get it all. When you get it to Cheyenne, if you will, that mission, that particular task, is complete.

I discussed this with some of our guys one time, and they said, "You may think it's a cattle drive. But we think it's a stampede."

In truth, it is, to a large degree. We're probably riding really hell-bent for leather here -- leaning forward in the saddle -- and it's probably raining sideways, and there's lightning bolts out of the sky like that famous Frederick Remington print called "Stampede." I have to give credit to an earlier boss of mine for that image as well, the great General John -- Jack -- Galvin, who used that similar image. I think it's very appropriate to what we're doing here. What we're trying to do is just keep it all headed in the right direction.

We've got a tremendous amount of decentralization. The initiative by our young leaders and soldiers is incredible, and we applaud it and encourage it. Half the time they're way out ahead of us, and that's where they ought to be. That's the American way. The innovativeness of our soldiers is extraordinary -- their determination to do what they did in 125-degree heat during the summer when we were really in pretty primitive conditions; their courage to continue doing it as they're getting shot at and ambushed and improvised explosives detonated around their convoys. It's incredible. Again, the American public should be very, very proud of what our young soldiers are doing out here.


It strikes me that the military comes at this from a very practical ... a very non-ideological point of view. When you sit in Washington, people tend to read the [Washington] Post and the [New York] Times, and they see this war in terms of conflicting ideologies, whereas you guys take a very different approach. It's very striking to me.

Well, we're not sitting in Washington reading the Post and the New York Times. Yes, we're just trying to get the cattle to Cheyenne. We're trying to accomplish the mission that we've been given -- which is to maintain a safe and secure environment, and to foster the rebuilding of basic services, governmental infrastructure, and so forth. We've done a lot of discovery learning. But this stuff is not rocket science. This is basically all about hard work, common sense, and just keeping your nose to the grindstone and dragging on through a variety of challenges, through tough times -- and occasionally through good times.


PBS: Tough times. Right at the end of the briefing where I sat in, you had some news.

Yes.


PBS: Tell me about it.

Gen.: Well, that's about the toughest time we've had in Iraq. We lost 17 wonderful Screaming Eagles that night -- two helicopters -- still under investigation right now. But we do think that they did collide, and we do think now that there probably was an RPG involved. We're not sure if it hit one of the aircraft, or if it led that aircraft to change its course very quickly. That's still very much unclear. In fact, we may never know, because there were no survivors on one of those aircraft. ...


PBS: How did the news come to you?

Gen.: We got it over the radio. First we thought that there was one aircraft down, and then all of a sudden there was a second aircraft missing.


PBS: You were sitting right here at the briefing?

Gen.: We were, we were. The brigade commander went streaking over to the site, and we started getting reports that there were two sites with wreckage. Then there were survivors at one site, but there were dead at the other site. We were trying to figure out how this could be that one helicopter could be a couple hundred meters apart from the wreckage and so forth. All of a sudden, we realized to our even greater horror that it was two aircraft that had gone down.

It doesn't get any lower than that, I can tell you. We take every casualty personally, very deeply personally. These are our soldiers. This is like losing a member of the family. To lose 17 of them, and in the blink of an eye, was just horrible beyond belief.



The war is a mess...but I like this guy, alot.

Although I think a surge of troops will prove unsuccessful in stabilizing Iraq,
I figure if GW is dead-set on doing it - this guy is the best to try...

NY Times article

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5 — The selection of Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus to serve as the senior American commander in Iraq signals an important turn in United States strategy.

As a supporter of increased forces in Iraq, General Petraeus is expected to back a rapid five-brigade expansion, in sharp contrast to his predecessor, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who has been openly skeptical that additional troops would help stabilize the country.

Having overseen the recent drafting of the military’s counterinsurgency manual, General Petraeus is also likely to change the American military operation in Baghdad. American forces can be expected to take up positions in neighborhoods throughout the capital instead of limiting themselves to conducting patrols from large, fortified bases in and around the city.

The overarching goal of the American military operation may be altered as well. Under General Casey, the principal focus has been on transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces, so American troops could gradually withdraw. Now, the emphasis will shift to protecting the Iraqi population from sectarian strife and insurgent attacks.

Since his appointment was disclosed Thursday, General Petraeus has not spoken publicly about his plans for Iraq. But the doctrine he has advocated suggests that he will want all five of the combat brigades slated to go to Iraq as quickly as possible instead of waiting for them to be phased in.

Before the selection of General Petraeus, there was some doubt about whether the top Iraq commander would be an enthusiastic executor of the new strategy President Bush is preparing to unveil next week — one that could send 20,000 new troops to Iraq. Now, the White House will have an articulate officer to champion and shape that strategy, an important asset for an administration that has decided to buck the tide of public opinion by deepening the American military involvement in Iraq. While some Democratic lawmakers have insisted that any increase be limited to a few months, neither the While House nor General Petraeus would support such a deadline.

To many civilians, the military seems monolithic. But in fact, there has been a lively debate behind the scenes about the best way to achieve the United States’ objectives in Iraq — or at least to preserve a measure of stability as sectarian passions threaten to engulf the country.

At one end of the spectrum have been General Casey, Gen. John P. Abizaid, the head of the United States Central Command, and Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who is in charge of training Iraqi security forces.

They have advocated plans to hand over security responsibilities to the Iraqis while gradually reducing American forces and shrinking the number of American bases in Iraq, as conditions permit. Their argument has been that a lengthy expansion of American forces in Iraq will simply put off the day when Iraqis take more responsibility for their security.

Taking a different view, other officers have argued for sending more troops while stepping up economic efforts, the better to apply the military’s new counterinsurgency doctrine. Progress in stabilizing Iraq, they argue, will come only when the Iraqi public does not feel that it needs militias or insurgent groups to ensure its security, and when it concludes that its basic economic needs are being met.

Training and advising the Iraqi forces should continue to be an important priority, these officers have argued, but the Iraqis cannot be expected to shoulder the brunt of the security effort so quickly.

General Petraeus has been squarely in this camp, as was reflected in the military’s new counterinsurgency field manual.

The United States has sought to apply the basic lessons of counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad before — most notably during Operation Together Forward II, the second phase of an effort begun over the summer to reduce violence in Baghdad.

But that effort foundered when the United States and Iraqi authorities failed to marshal sufficient forces to hold neighborhoods after they were cleared of insurgents and militias, and when the Iraqis failed to follow through with the job and reconstruction programs that were intended to win over Iraqi citizens.

By all accounts, Mr. Bush plans to announce an expanded military and economic push. But the United States will still have to contend with the political realities in Iraq, including a Shiite-dominated government that has often seemed more sectarian than inclusive, and may not prove enthusiastic about a larger and more visible role for the Americans.

At 54, General Petraeus has a long Army record and a diverse array of contacts and supporters. Having earned a Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, he invited experts from Harvard, nongovernmental organizations and policy groups to review an early draft of the counterinsurgency manual.

During the invasion, he led the 101st Airborne Division, which sought to emphasize economic and political reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq.

When L. Paul Bremer III, the second American civilian administrator of Iraq, formally abolished the Iraqi Army without announcing a plan to pay the former soldiers, General Petraeus approached one of Mr. Bremer’s aides and delivered a clear message. The decision to leave Iraqi soldiers without a livelihood was prompting angry protests and putting the lives of American soldiers at risk. Mr. Bremer later decided to pay the Iraqi troops.

In June 2004, General Petraeus was charged with training the new Iraqi Army, a position he held for more than a year. It is a mission that is critical to American efforts in Iraq but which is as yet a mixed success.

As the senior American officer in Iraq, General Petraeus will work with Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, a subordinate who has day-to-day command of the forces and who also supports a troop increase.

Instead of immediately confronting the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia led by the cleric Moktada al-Sadr, the initial strategy is likely to be more subtle: by trying to tamp down sectarian killings, American troops — and the Iraqi forces they are partnered with — will try to reduce the population’s reliance on militias for security, making it easier for the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to take the long-promised step of limiting the role of the militias.

Whether a modicum of stability can be achieved amid the violence and sectarian agendas in Iraq is uncertain at best. But General Petraeus seems determined to give the military’s new counterinsurgency plan its most ambitious field test.

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If only he had been in charge earlier, with double the troops...oh well...one last bite at the apple...which I expect to result in a surge of US casualties.