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Snuffysmith
Although there were lonely voices arguing that the Army needed to focus on counterinsurgency in the wake of the Cold War—Dan Bolger, Eliot Cohen, and Steve Metz chief among them—the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war against America from the shadows.

The story of how the Army found itself less than ready to fight an insurgency goes back to the Army’s unwillingness to internalize and build upon the lessons of Vietnam. Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker has written that in Vietnam, “The U.S. Army, predisposed to fight a conventional enemy that fought using conventional tactics, overpowered innovative ideas from within the Army and from outside it. As a result, the U.S. Army was not as effective at learning as it should have been, and its failures in Vietnam had grave implications for both the Army and the nation.” Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane concurs, recently noting that in Iraq, “We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency . . . After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision.”

The Evolution of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Doctrine is “the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. . . . Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations.” Doctrine is thus enormously important to the United States Army; it codifies both how the institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield. Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should be organized (large heavy divisions or small military transition teams to embed in local security forces), what missions it should train to accomplish (conventional combat or counterinsurgency, or some balance between those two kinds of warfare), and what equipment it needs (heavy tanks supported by unarmored trucks for a conventional battlefield with front lines, or light armored vehicles to fight an insurgent enemy).

Although there are many reasons why the Army was unprepared for the insurgency in Iraq, among the most important was the lack of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the war began. When the Iraqi insurgency emerged the Army had not published a field manual on the subject of counterinsurgency for more than twenty years, since the wake of the El Salvador campaign. The Army therefore did not have all of the equipment it needed to protect its soldiers against the time-honored insurgent tactic of roadside bombs. It had not trained its soldiers that the key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting the population, nor had it empowered them with all of the political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills they needed to accomplish that objective. The Army did not even have a common understanding of the problems inherent in any counterinsurgency campaign, as it had not studied such battles, digested their lessons, and debated ways to achieve success in counterinsurgency campaigns. It is not unfair to say that in 2003 most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.

Belatedly recognizing the problem as the insurgency in Iraq developed, the Army hurriedly set out to remedy the situation. The Doctrine Division of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, produced an interim Counterinsurgency Field Manual on October 1, 2004, designated Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22. Work on a replacement manual began immediately but did not catch fire until October 2005, when Lieutenant General David Petraeus returned from his second tour in Iraq to assume command of CAC and take responsibility for all doctrinal development in the United States Army.

Petraeus is an atypical general officer, holding a doctorate in international relations from Princeton University in addition to his Airborne Ranger qualifications. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division in the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, taking responsibility for governing Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, with a firm but open hand. Petraeus focused on the economic and political development of his sector of Iraq, inspiring his command with the question, “What have you done for the people of Iraq today?” He worked to build Iraqi security forces able to provide security to the people of the region and quickly earned the sobriquet Malik Daoud (King David) from the people of Mosul.

Petraeus’s skill in counterinsurgency soon led to a promotion. In June 2004, just a few months after his return from Iraq with the 101st, he became a Lieutenant General with responsibility for the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq. Petraeus threw himself into the effort to create Iraqi Security Forces for the next fifteen months, and was then assigned to command CAC and Fort Leavenworth—not so much to catch his breath as to drive change in the Army to make it more effective in counterinsurgency. He focused on the Army’s extensive education systems, making training officers about counterinsurgency his top priority. Petraeus also built a strong relationship with his Marine Corps counterpart, Lieutenant General James Mattis, who had commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial assault on Baghdad and later during a tour in Al Anbar province in 2004. Mattis made his Division’s motto “No better friend, no worse enemy—First Do No Harm.” The two generals established an impressive rapport based on their shared understanding of the conduct of counterinsurgency and of the urgent need to reform their services to make them more capable of conducting this most difficult kind of war.

To take lead on perhaps the most important driver of intellectual change for the Army and Marine Corps—a complete rewrite of the interim Counterinsurgency Field Manual—Petraeus turned to his West Point classmate Conrad Crane. Crane, a retired lieutenant colonel with a doctorate in history from Stanford University, called on the expertise of both academics and Army and Marine Corps veterans of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. He took advantage of an Information Operations conference at Fort Leavenworth in December 2005 to pull together the core writing team and outline both the manual as a whole and the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes of counterinsurgency that would frame it. Chapter authors were selected, given their marching orders, and threatened with grievous physical injury if they did not produce drafts in short order. All survived, and a draft version of the Field Manual in your hands was produced in just two months.

The tight timeline was driven by an unprecedented vetting session of the draft manual held at Leavenworth in mid-February 2006. This conference, which brought together journalists, human rights advocates, academics, and practitioners of counterinsurgency, thoroughly revised the manual and dramatically improved it. Some military officers questioned the utility of the representatives from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) and the media, but they proved to be the most insightful of commentators. James Fallows, of the Atlantic Monthly, commented at the end of the conference that he had never seen such an open transfer of ideas in any institution, and stated that the nation would be better for more such exchanges.

Then began a summer of revisions that bled over into a fall of revisions as nearly every word in the manual was argued over by the military, by academics, by politicians, and by the press, which pounced upon a leaked early draft that was posted on the Internet. The final version was sharper than the initial draft, finding a balance between the discriminate targeting of irreconcilable insurgents and the persuasion of less committed enemies to give up the fight with the political, economic, and informational elements of power. It benefited greatly from the revisions of far too many dedicated public servants to cite here, most of whom took on the task after duty hours out of a desire to help the Army and Marine Corps adapt to the pressing demands of waging counterinsurgency more effectively. Among them was Lieutenant General James Amos, who picked up the torch of leading change for the Marine Corps when Mattis left Quantico to take command of the I Marine Expeditionary Force.

The finished book was released on December 15, 2006, to an extraordinary international media outcry; Conrad Crane was featured in Newsweek as a “Man to Watch” for his contribution to the intellectual development of the Army and Marine Corps. The field manual was widely reviewed, including by several Jihadi Web sites; copies have been found in Taliban training camps in Pakistan. It was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the first month after its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and Marine Corps Web sites.

Impact of the Doctrine

Perhaps no doctrinal manual in the history of the Army has been so eagerly anticipated and so well received as Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. It is designed both to help the Army and Marine Corps prepare for the next counterinsurgency campaign and to make substantive contributions to the national efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most important contribution of the manual is likely to be its role as a catalyst in the process of making the Army and Marine Corps more effective learning organizations that are better able to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of modern counterinsurgency campaigns. The most notable section of the manual is probably the Zen-like “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency” in the first Chapter on page 47. These capture the often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency. The nine maxims turn conventional military thinking on its head, highlighting the extent of the change required for a conventional military force to adapt itself to the demands of counterinsurgency.

The field manual emphasizes the primary role of traditionally non-military activities and the decisive role of other agencies and organizations in achieving success in counterinsurgency in Chapter 2, “Unity of Effort.” In Chapter 3, “Intelligence,” the field manual shows it understands that, while firepower is the determinant of success in conventional warfare, the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the location and identity of the insurgent enemy derived from a supportive population; one of the Principles of Counterinsurgency is that “Intelligence Drives Operations.” The Appendix on “Social Network Analysis” helps drive the Army’s intelligence system away from a focus on analysis of conventional enemy units toward a personality-based understanding of the networks of super-empowered individuals that comprise the most dangerous enemies the United States confronts today.

The Field Manual introduces new doctrinal constructs including Operational Design in Chapter 4 and Logical Lines of Operation in Chapter 5. Operational Design, a gift from the Marine Corps members of the writing team, focuses on identifying the unique array of enemies and problems that generate a contemporary insurgency, and the adaptation of operational art to meet those challenges. The Operations Chapter promulgates multiple lines of operation—examples are Combat Operations, Building Host Nation Security Forces, Essential Services, Good Governance, Economic Development, Information Operations—that must be conducted simultaneously to achieve the objectives of the Campaign Plan. Chapter 6 focuses attention on the need to build and develop the host-nation security forces that ultimately will win or lose counterinsurgency campaigns; third-nation forces can only hold the ring and set the conditions for success of local forces. The manual also recognizes in Chapter 7 the unique leadership challenges inherent in any war without front lines and against an enemy who hides among the sea of the people, and then prescribes solutions to the logistic problems of counterinsurgency campaigns in Chapter 8.

The “Guide to Action,” based on an influential Military Review article by the Australian counterinsurgent Dr. David Kilcullen, provides tips and guidelines for the sergeants and young officers who will have to implement the precepts of counterinsurgency on the mean streets of distant lands. The manual concludes with an annotated bibliography listing both classic counterinsurgency texts and more modern works more directly applicable to the Global War on Terror. The inclusion of a bibliography of non-military texts—to this author’s knowledge, the first ever printed in an Army doctrinal manual—is key evidence of the Army’s acceptance of the need to “Learn and Adapt” to succeed in modern counterinsurgency operations.

The Long Road Ahead

Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but it is not sufficient. Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information operations, must all improve simultaneously and steadily over a long period of time if America’s determined insurgent enemies are to be defeated. All elements of the United States government—and those of her allies in this Long War that has been well described as a “Global Counterinsurgency” campaign—must be integrated into the effort to build stable and secure societies that can secure their own borders and do not provide safe haven for terrorists. Recognizing this fact—a recognition spurred by the development of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual—the Department of State hosted an interagency counterinsurgency conference in Washington, D.C., in September 2006. That conference in turn built a consensus behind the need for an interagency counterinsurgency manual. It promises to result in significant changes to the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the other agencies of the U.S. government that have such an important role to play in stabilizing troubled countries around the globe.

Of the many books that were influential in the writing of Field Manual 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Galula, a French Army officer who drew many valuable lessons from his service in France’s unsuccessful campaign against Algerian insurgents, was a strong advocate of counterinsurgency doctrine. He wrote, “If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved. Is this not precisely what a coherent, well-understood, and accepted doctrine would tend to achieve?”

Precisely.

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The SWJ thanks the University of Chicago Press for permission to repost The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency and encourages our site visitors to follow the link for additonal timely, topical and important works on the issues that are shaping our Small Wars future.

FM 3-24 'hard copies' can be purchased here from the Univiersity of Chicago Press.
Marine
Let me spoil the University of Chicago's fund raiser. You can get a copy for free here:
http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications/
Marine
First Sergeant Andy Dennison is currently serving in Iraq with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. He previously served in combat in Somalia. His views are his own. He does not speak for the US Army or the Department of Defense.

June 28, 2007
After having been deployed to Iraq for several months, tragedy struck my family. In February, I had received word that my mother had fallen terminally ill, and shortly after arriving home on emergency leave, she passed away. It was while I was home, along with the many other personal troubles I was enduring, one problem weighed heavily on me: although I had been in Iraq for nearly four months, I had failed to fully comprehend the gravity and necessity of our mission in the Middle East.


As a First Sergeant, understanding the unit's mission has always been a priority for me. We are simply here to rid Iraq of its insurgency and al-Qaeda, and to secure the future for a free and democratic Iraq. Somehow, early on in our deployment, everyone's perception of the war became black and white. We must kill or capture all remnants of the insurgency in order to achieve the success we set out for. For the most part, that is why we are fighting. We are indeed in Iraq to secure its newfound sovereignty.


However, it is far too easy for us soldiers to become shortsighted and neglect the full ramifications of "winning" or "losing" this war. Admittedly, losing sight of the larger picture is a natural response when the bullets go whizzing by. That said, things on the ground are much more complicated than Katie Couric or the New York Times will tell you.


Here in Iraq, the war is without a doubt being won. Along with the set-backs and fatalities, we are winning important moral and military victories, and both of those kinds of wins are equally important. Yet, I see played out all too often on the evening news the supposed despair we are facing in this seemingly hopeless land. Now, without bashing the mainstream media, I believe they too have fallen into the same rut of short-sightedness. They have become vultures picking over the remains of what happens here in Iraq simply because they know that Americans have become accustomed to hearing bad news about US military operations. The simple and the sensational sells, but it rarely accords with reality. This is why they peddle little more than war-weariness.


The overall situation in Iraq is improving: Iraq is steadily regaining its economic feet; oil production is back on the upswing, higher than prewar output; men and women of all creeds are enjoying a newfound sense of freedom; insurgents, terrorists, and foreign fighters can no longer openly parade about in public and dominate Iraqi communities by means of fear, terror and murder. Regardless of what the world's media may depict, Iraq is undoubtedly progressing in the right direction. With the tide beginning to turn in our favor and against our enemies, we need to reaffirm our resolve as Americans to win this war.


As Americans and the world's only remaining superpower, we still have an inherent obligation to police up the world's trash. As ugly and tedious a responsibility as this may seem, it certainly falls on us to carry it out. We all saw first-hand on September 11, 2001 what awaits us if we even hesitate to stomp out evil as it begins to spread. Unfortunately, isolationism is apparently becoming fashionable again in the international community and among the chattering classes when it comes to the Middle East. The belief that not getting involved spares a society getting its hands dirty is much in vogue.


We as soldiers (past and present) know better. We know that serving our country calls for the courage to go against the grain of conformity, and maintaining the integrity to follow through with what you know to be true. Nothing short of victory will suffice for our country's future security.


It is a shame that while the whole of the United Nations believed that Saddam Hussein possessed the weapons that could wipe out entire cities at whim, they seemed ugly reluctant to impede him from employing such weapons. We should remind ourselves that the United States is by far the most diplomatic superpower in modern history. America did in fact give Saddam and his Baath Party a fair shake in cooperating with UN officials. Hussein and his lackeys simply scoffed at the world as they obstructed the US inspectors investigating the truth about Iraq's weapons arsenal. But among the member nation states of the United Nations who called for such investigations, none was willing to act on what they believed to be an imminent threat in Iraq. Granted, intelligence may have proven wrong on weapons of mass destruction, but before we knew of any faulty intelligence, the international community was uniform in its certainty that Saddam had access to such weapons. The US rightly took it upon itself without the support of the majority to put an end to negotiating with rogue nations and terrorist organizations. The day of diplomatic resolution to imminent threats was over. That was the lesson of 9/11.


Yet four years into the war, many have forgotten the bigger picture. Yes, it has taken an unimaginable toll on American lives; yes, the future seems unclear for an ultimate withdrawal from Iraq; and yes, many believe that progress has been slow. Unfortunately, a war, on whatever scale, cannot be embarked upon without the full realization that Americans will lose their lives. America does not lightly decide to go to war, but once decided upon, war requires ultimate sacrifices - sacrifices that we as Americans know have to be made. There is no soldier, nor is there any proud American, who would not gladly surrender his or her life in defense of the greatest country on Earth.


Those sacrifices must be honored.


Withdrawing from a battle that has not met our every expectation is deplorable. We cannot simply turn back because we believe the cost too high. We must commit ourselves to a charge that nothing short of supreme victory will suffice; anything less is a betrayal of those who have already given the last full measure of their devotion to this cause. Meanwhile, our expectations must be realistic. We cannot expect a nation who saw over 30 years of oppression to advance towards economic and political livelihood in half a decade. Recovery will continue long after America has left Iraq.


The war in Iraq is not just a war in Iraq. We often hear that "foreign fighters" are joining the fight despite the thousands of terrorists that have been killed during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. It has also come to light that other nations fund and contribute direct support to our enemies, even though we have seen some modest success in slowing the flow of cash to terrorist groups throughout the world. We must keep in mind that the end result of the war in Iraq is not just that Iraq can be free, but that terrorists are put on the run, where they are less likely to be able to repeat what happened on 9/11. Those who aren't smart enough to run and hide elsewhere usually end up here in Iraq, where my colleagues and I have the opportunity to make their acquaintance.


Here in Iraq, at times I find myself asking whether the world is being made safer by our actions here. Then I ask myself, were all of those involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing held accountable? Did we bring to justice those responsible for the Khobar Tower attack? Were the perpetrators of the attack on the USS Cole and the American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania held to account for their actions? The answer is simply no.


We saw four unwarranted terrorist attacks against the US in a single decade and we did absolutely nothing in response. None of the trespasses prior to 9/11 received the full wrath of the United States, as was fitting, and it's unfortunate that it took that one terrible day to make America realize that there is truly evil in the world that must be confronted militarily.


If anything, our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are an attempt to push back against America's enemies and the looming darkness that threatens us. As Americans, we live in a paradise, and it is thoughtless of us to think that our freedoms exist simply because evil will never encroach upon them. We have had to secure our freedoms for over 230 years against virtually constant assaults, and will forever have to defend it against all enemies. America is truly worth fighting for. Anything short of victory in Iraq will jeopardize our freedoms and our future, and in light of all the past sacrifices made in our nation's history to preserve freedom and the future, that we cannot allow. Nothing short of victory should be acceptable.
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