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Snuffysmith
Assignment Iraq: Halfhearted at State? - John Carey, Washington Times
Army Officers: Over Hill and Dale - Baltimore Sun editorial
In Pakistan, Echoes of Iran - David Ignatius, Washington Post
Musharraf’s Martial Plan - Benazir Bhutto, New York Times
In Pakistan, the Army is Key - Shuja Nawaz, Boston Globe
Pakistan Tumults - Helle Dale, Washington Times
Pakistan’s General Anarchy - Mohammed Hanif, New York Times
Pakistan’s Path London Times editorial
The Prince of Islamabad – James Robbins, National Review
Musharraf's Power Play Beginning of the End? – Hassan Abbas, Daily Star
The General vs. The Bush Doctrine – Rich Lowry, National Review
Musharraf Doesn't Need Any More Enemies – Con Coughlin, London Daily Telegraph
Pakistan’s State of Denial - Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, National Review
One-On-One With Iran’s Opposition – John Hughes, Christian Science Monitor
Rice: It’s About Iran? – David Brooks, New York Times
Dithering Diplomats as Iran Options Fade – John Bolton, New York Post
The Iranian Challenge – Trita Parsi, The Nation
A Chance for Nuclear Leadership - Deepti Choubey, Washington Post
Whose Road Map? – Jeff Halper, Jerusalem Post
Gaza Doesn't Need Aid: Has £2bn Gas Field – Tim Butcher, London Daily Telegraph
Abandoning SderotJerusalem Post editorial
Egypt's Race Between Education and Catastrophe - David Arnold, Los Angeles Times
Good News and Bad News From Abizaid - Rami Khouri, Daily Star
Muslim Young Too Easy to Exploit - Zia Haider Rahman, London Daily Telegraph
Nazis and Islamists - Paul Belien, Washington Times
Islam and the West: Keep Yardstick to Yourself – Yasser Kalil, Daily Star
Sir Ian Blair Didn't Mastermind 2005 Bombings – Jan Moir, London Daily Telegraph
Turkey and the EU: Patronising and Mistimed ReportThe Independent editorial
Dragging Out The Torture Debate – Massimo Calabresi, Time Magazine
Giuliani Unplugged: Torture and Terrorism - Matthew Continetti, Weekly Standard
Democrats and Waterboarding - Alan Dershowitz, Wall Street Journal
Help for Mexico - Washington Post editorial
Unstable Future for China - Michael Fragoso, Baltimore Sun
A Veterans Day With Purpose - Kathy Roth-Douquet, USA Today
Snuffysmith
IEDs on Home Turf Washington Times editorial
Jihadland: Clear and Present DangerNew York Daily News editorial
Open Borders Create Peril for U.S.Washington Examiner editorial
Home Front: A War We Are Still Losing – Terrence Jeffrey, Washington Times
Religious Radicals at Saudi Academy in Virginia – Stephen Spuiell, National Review
Some Can’t Afford Victory in Iraq – Jonathan Gurwitz, San Antonio Express-News
Iraq Economy Muddles Along – Richard O’Hanlon, Washington Times
Would Tehran do the Unthinkable? - Gregory Scoblete, Real Clear Politics
Gathering Storm in Pakistan? – New York Times editorial
Pakistan’s War on Democracy AdvocatesLos Angeles Times editorial
Musharraf: Part of Solution or Problem?The Australian editorial
For India, A Worrisome Drama in Pakistan – David Broder, Washington Post
Musharraf’s Coup: What to Do – Amir Taheri, New York Post
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Musharraf? – Roger Cohen, New York Times
Don’t Forget Enemy’s Barbarism – Meghan Cox Gurdon, Washington Examiner
If This Peace Process Fails – Jackson Diehl, Washington Post
Russia is Becoming our Enemy Again – Michael Weiss, Weekly Standard
Burma’s Junta Plays to Win – Connie Levitt, Sydney Morning Herald
Saving Civilization from Itself – Arthur Herman, Wall Street Journal
No Tenure at Columbia for Hatred – Joel Mowbray, Washington Times
Torture: The New Abortion – Rosa Brooks, Los Angeles Times

Snuffysmith
Pakistan's private TV channels struggle By Laura King Their transmissions within the country blocked by the government under emergency rule, the outlets still manage to get out the news.
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal a U.S. worry By Greg Miller American intelligence agencies are concerned the weaponry could be diverted amid the nation's political crisis.
Snuffysmith

Preparing for Life After Oil

Michael T. Klare, The Nation

ForeignPolicy: Welcome to the Age of Insuffiency: As oil prices hit new highs and supplies sink, our way of life will drastically change.
Snuffysmith
Recasting Long War as Joint Sino-American Venture – Thomas Barnett, Esquire
The Marines: Premier Expeditionary Warriors - Frank Hoffman, FPRI E-note
How to Stop IEDs - Gian Gentile, San Francisco Chronicle
Last Chance for Public Diplomacy – Clifford May, National Review
Rebel Diplomats – Fred Gedrich, New York Post
Blackwater’s ImpunityLos Angeles Times editorial
Pakistan Upheaval Rouses U.S. ConcernsUSA Today editorial roundup
Musharraf’s Latest PledgeWashington Times editorial
Time’s Up, Mr. MusharrafThe Economist editorial
Pakistan-U.S. Relationship is BankruptLondon Daily Telegraph editorial
Marcos… Pinochet… Musharraf? – Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post
The Real Musharraf – Asma Jahangir, Washington Post
Musharraf's Grip Looking Unbreakable – Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star
Pakistan on the Brink – Diana West, Washington Times
An India-U.S. Alliance? – Austin Bay, Washington Times
Why Europe Won't Sanction Iran - Robert Maginnis, Human Events
Italy’s Immigration Agita – Gerald Robbins, Weekly Standard
Deal With ColombiaWashington Post editorial
Frontline Troops Spending Must be IncreasedLondon Times editorial
Al Qaeda’s Generational Split – Gregory Johnsen, Boston Globe
Radical Islam Behind Bars – Stephen Schwartz, Weekly Standard
The War Against Women in Congo – Kevin Sites, Chicago Tribune
Kiwi Terror Law Debate - New Zealand Herald opinion question
TSA “Working Diligently” – Kip Hawley, USA Today
A Post-Iraq G.I. Bill? – Jim Webb and Chuck Hagle, New York Times
Who Saw the Latest Anti-War Movie? – Jonah Goldberg, Miami Herald

Snuffysmith

Silencing the opposition
Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party, is put under house arrest

Snuffysmith

COLUMN: Europe.view

Over a barrel
The oily politics of silence

Snuffysmith
LEADERS: Martial law in Pakistan
Time's up, Mr Musharraf
No longer the potential solution, the general has become a big part of Pakistan's problem
Snuffysmith
Rule of Force vs. Rule of Law in Pakistan
Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar
Nov 8, 2007

Making Democracy Safe for the World
Yu Bin
Nov 8, 2007

Taiwan's Right to a State
Ian Williams
Nov 8, 2007

grammydidi


My thanks to you, Snuffy, for all the work of the previous links!!!!!! Geezzzzz, more reading than I can do this entire day! I'll be sure and get back to this as often as I can.
Snuffysmith
Musharraf Must Go
by William Hartung, TPM Cafe
After how siding with a tyrant hurt us in Iran, we should not repeat history in Pakistan.

Snuffysmith
QUOTE(grammydidi @ Nov 9 2007, 04:29 PM) *
My thanks to you, Snuffy, for all the work of the previous links!!!!!! Geezzzzz, more reading than I can do this entire day! I'll be sure and get back to this as often as I can.


Thanks. Many of these show up in my blog, but I thought I would start two threads here - one for articles on foreign policy and the other on politics. Trying to cover the major ones across the spectrum. Hopefully there is enough information in the title so you can decide if you want to read the article.
Snuffysmith
"Losing Pakistan"

Dear Friends and Colleagues:

This morning, I found that an excerpt of a bloggingheadsTV exchange I had on the subject of “Losing Pakistan” with New York Sun foreign affairs correspondent Eli Lake appeared on the front of the NY Times opinion page:

http://www.nytimes.com/pages/opinion/index.html

It will only be there during the day today — but if you want the actual link to the page, it is here:

http://video.on.nytimes.com/?fr_story=c565...997a45276483bff

Hope you find this of interest,

Steve Clemons
Snuffysmith
Pakistanis' anger at Musharraf extends to U.S. By Henry Chu Washington is perceived as propping up an autocratic leader and ignoring the people's desire for democracy. Many want it to stop its 'interference.'
Snuffysmith
Executing Winning Strategy in Iraq – Kimberly Kagan, Weekly Standard
Fort Irwin: ‘Ghanzi Province’ Lessons – Sarah Holewinski, Washington Post
How to Win the War of Ideas – Robert Satloff, Washington Post
Pelosi’s Prescription for Failure in IraqNew York Post editorial
Attached to Iraq – James Cannon, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Teaching America About Our Heroes – William Bennett, National Review
Pakistan and the Bush-Biden DoctrineWall Street Journal editorial
Iran’s Mullahs Puzzled Putin – Amir Taheri, New York Post
Pakistani PokerLondon Times editorial
Pakistani Make-BelieveBoston Globe editorial
Pakistan’s Plan B Deficiency – Gary Sick, Los Angeles Times
Assessing Pakistan – Charles Krauthammer, National Review
Our Pakistan Challenge – Daniel Twining, Weekly Standard
Musharraf's Gamble Cannot Succeed – David Warren, Ottawa Citizen
Musharraf Has Failed the Country – Trudy Rubin, Miami Herald
Dictators and Democrats – Victor Davis Hanson, National Review
The U.N.’s Campaign to Demonize Israel – U.N. Watch, Miami Herald
Making a Two-State Solution Happen – David Horovitz, Jerusalem Post
Israel: Why Go To Annapolis? – Uri Dromi, Miami Herald
Chances of Middle East Breakthrough - Shibley Telhami, Baltimore Sun
Middle East Peace: Time for Modesty – Richard Haass, Daily Star
Guantanamo by the Numbers? - Bowker and Kaye, New York Times
Gitmo Observation Deck – James Jay Carafano, National Review
Hugo Chavez’s Criminal Paradise - Moises Naim, Los Angeles Times
Roses and Reality in Georgia? – New York Times editorial
Tragedy in Georgia – Ralph Peters, New York Post
On Timor’s Hard Road – Phillip Adams, The Australian
‘Peace’ Movement Passé? - L. Brent Bozell III, Washington Times
The Real Drug WarLos Angeles Times editorial
“Shipriders” on the Great Lakes – Colin Kenny, Ottawa Citizen

Snuffysmith
http://www.mlive.com/columns/aanews/index.....xml&coll=2

More From The Ann Arbor News
Danger lurks in use of term 'Islamofascism'
Thursday, November 08, 2007

If language is a window on the world, a deliberate smudging of that window will make it harder to see the world clearly and comprehend it. So it is with the highly ideological term "Islamofascist,'' a label that is being wielded as a blunt weapon in a left-right debate and has been carelessly bandied about by some presidential candidates.

Recently, the former leftist turned rightist David Horowitz promoted something called "Islamofascism Awareness Week'' on college campuses. The implication was that the academic left has so lost its bearings that it can no longer recognize its historic enemy, the old fascist wolf, under that beast's new disguise. Another apparent aim was to discredit scholars who insist on making careful distinctions among the various movements and ideologies that are grouped under the rubric of political Islam.

Transparent as the intentions of Horowitz may be, the Republican candidates' use of "Islamofascism'' is cruder still, and may cause considerably more harm. Just before he dropped out of the race for the Republican presidential nomination, Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas spoke of a threat from Islamofascism during a visit to the Boston Globe. Rudy Giuliani - whose foreign policy adviser, Norman Podhoretz, just published a book touting World War IV against Islamofascism - commonly derides the Democrats because they "couldn't even utter the word 'Islamic terrorism.''' And former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, while using the less obfuscatory term "radical Islamic jihadists,'' has been striving to keep up with his competition by putting out a television ad titled "Jihad'' and invoking what he calls "a military threat unlike anything we've known before.''

The next American president will need to have a lucid understanding of the threats facing this country. One of those threats undeniably comes from al-Qaida and like-minded groups. But the bands that swear allegiance to Osama bin Laden must be seen for what they are: stateless fanatics with a purist nostalgia for a seventh-century political and social order. Their primary goal is to overthrow regimes in the Muslim world they disdain as insufficiently Islamic.

Al-Qaida and company cannot be compared with the fascist powers ruled by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco - neither for their ideas nor for their military power. The Nazis scorned religion, wanting to make the state the sole object of worship. Bin Laden and Hitler might share a proclivity for cruelty and killing, but for little else. Hitler cherished the operas of Wagner; bin Laden and his Taliban allies have been known to put musicians to the lash for playing music at a wedding. And bin Laden has no panzer divisions.

The intellectually lazy analogy of Islamism to fascism has another unwelcome effect. It obscures the significant differences that exist among disparate governments, movements and terrorist networks in the Muslim world. If all Islamists are carelessly labeled Islamofascists, it becomes practically impossible to distinguish the democratic, free-market, pro-European governing party of Turkey from the Taliban; or either of those Sunni parties from the Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah; or those three from Palestinian Hamas; or those four from al-Qaida.

Americans have already paid a terrible price for a president's belated discovery that there were two sects of Muslims in Iraq: Sunni and Shi'ite. It is precisely because the security threats of the 21st century are so different from those of the last century that the next president must be free of tendentious simplifications such as Islamofascism.

Loose talk about Islamofascism or Islamic terrorism also carries noxious undertones. Such labels intimate that there is something inherently dangerous about all Muslims. And there is a subtext to those terms, an implication that the West faces an inevitable worldwide clash of religions and civilizations.

There need not be any such apocalyptic conflict. One way to prevent it is to give things their proper names - and not to allow the threat from bin Laden and similar fringe groups to be blown out of proportion by ideologues indulging in loose talk about a third or fourth World War.

The Boston Globe
Snuffysmith
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=11889 November 10, 2007 Pakistan: In Too Deep
by Alan Bock Except for the hardly inconsequential difference that the U.S. is not conducting a military occupation, Pakistan is similar to Iraq in at least one important way. Once the initial mistake was made, it has become difficult for the United States to extricate itself (if it wanted to, which this administration almost certainly does not) and leave, changing the nature of the commitment or hunkering down will have results that can be spun as the unfortunate consequences of the U.S. not hanging tougher.

After 9/11, when it became obvious the United States was going to invade Afghanistan and would have a fairly substantial chance of ousting the Taliban regime (if not necessarily to manage the transition to anything like a decent society there) Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf made a strategic/tactical choice.

Musharraf’s secret police agency, the ISI, had been heavily involved in subsidizing, advising and sometimes lending concrete human assistance to the Taliban regime. To be fair, it was seen by some (though not all, the ISI was and is riddled with jihadist sympathizers and supported the huge network of radical madrassas throughout Pakistan teaching nothing much but rote memorization of the Koran and jihad) as a force for stability in a country that was pretty chaotic. But Musharraf, helped along by a few no-nonsense phone calls and visits from U.S. officials, decided that the Taliban was likely to be defeated and that at least for the next foreseeable period, it was prudent to cast one’s lot with the United States. So he did.

One can understand U.S. officials being pleased by this turn of events, and in fact Pakistan has been of some assistance in the vaunted "global war on terror," to the extent that U.S. officials occasionally looked beyond the quicksand of Iraq to notice that there were a few real threats out there in addition to the manufactured threat of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda. The mistake was to believe he was sincere.

Bush, like many intellectually incurious people who are impatient with details, places great stock in his supposedly preternatural ability to "size up" people after a brief encounter (remember his ability to look into Vladimir Putin’s soul?). A meeting or two with Musharraf allowed him to convince himself that Pervez was his kind of fella.

Well if you think about it, there are similarities between Musharraf, an army general who came to power in a bloodless coup in 1999 and has never paid anything more than lip service to such quaint notions as democracy, liberty and the importance of a civil society independent of the rulers of a country, and President Bush.

The Bushlet, with a little help from his friends, proved fairly adept at playing the democratic game at the raw and almost irrelevant level of finding ways to garner votes. But his relentless grasping for more "plenary" executive power – fed no doubt by Dick Cheney, who had been pining over the loss of institutional presidential power since Watergate – shows him to be a political leader with a lot more of the monarchist or autocrat than the instinctive democrat or libertarian. He uses words like "freedom" and "democracy" handily enough, but he presses for limitations on freedom and increased exercises of governmental power kept secret from and therefore unaccountable to the people.

It may be fruitless to wonder what goes on in that underused mind of his, but it may be something like a notion that limitations on freedom and increases in surveillance and government power are all not only necessary but desirable in the service of what he just might conceive of as a "higher" form of freedom than the rabble can understand – though in practice it translates into more power, perquisites and money for him and his circle. In short, it’s more than possible that Musharraf, who has virtually no democratic instincts or impulses, really is Bush’s kind of fella.

But I digress.

The upshot, from the administration’s perspective, was that Musharraf was not only deemed a reliable ally in the "war on terror," but an "indispensable" (former intelligence czar John Negroponte actually used the word within the last few days) cog in the wheel of the great American imperial enterprise. So the administration lavished money (at least $10 billion since 9/11, probably a good bit more if you could track the covert stuff) on Pakistan and pretended to believe that he was really some kind of democrat deep down inside, determined not only to defeat al-Qaeda and other nasty folk, but to bring his country ever closer to being a true democracy.

Many American officials, almost certainly including Bush himself, probably even managed to convince themselves that this was the case. Unless you have a certain cold and calculating Metternichian cast of mind, it is difficult for many people – especially many Americans – to acknowledge openly that you are supporting a leader in another country strictly on the basis of a cold-blooded calculation of what your interests are and how that person can advance them, caring not a whit whether that person is a saint or a sinner. Bush can calculate in that way, I suspect, but I suspect he feels more comfortable when he can convince himself that he’s really operating not out of cold interest, but in service of some higher ideal, like promoting democracy or paving the way for the spread of Christianity.

Fortunately – I was going to say for him but not for us, but in the longer perspective is it really all that fortunate for him? – he seldom has much trouble convincing himself, no matter how far-fetched the case, or how wide the gap between noble words and sordid actions.

So Bush kept sending the money and praising Musharraf extravagantly whenever the two met or when some development in Pakistan created a perceived need to comment. He had measured the man himself, after all, and it would be a sign of weakness to alter that original estimation.

So when Musharraf declared martial law – excuse me, a state of emergency – and began jailing opposition party members and journalists, it took Bush several days to process the information. And even when he finally made the phone call to tell his old buddy Perv that he really should take off that army uniform and hold elections as scheduled, he didn’t (unless there’s something we haven’t been told, which wouldn’t be all that unusual, but I suspect this would have been trumpeted) mention the idea of freeing all those "enemy combatants." And he went so far as to claim that unlike in Burma/Myanmar, Pakistan had actually been on the road to democracy, so it deserved to have some slack cut.

As a result of offering unquestioning support for a natural dictator who could mouth the phrases associated with democracy just often enough, the U.S. confronts a situation in Pakistan in which almost all the likely alternatives are unsavory. The Taliban and al-Qaeda really are resurgent in the border territories, and whatever relatively moderate and/or secular elements remain in Pakistan (long ago they used to be dominant) are utterly sick of Musharraf. The most ungovernable country in the world, as some have described it, is becoming less governable by the day (which in an existential sense might be a point in its favor, but in the short run looks rather chaotic and violent).

It’s hard to see anything less than disastrous in the next few weeks and months.

And, of course, the notion that Bush is the least bit sincere in his protestations that his relentless desire to intervene in the affairs of other countries has the slightest relationship to promoting democracy in anything other than an incantatory sense is now in shreds. From now on invoking the desire to spread democracy can only provoke sneers and guffaws.

Nice work.

Snuffysmith

Did He Really Say That?

Musharraf and the Drunk Uncle
By MOHAMMED HANIF

Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf deserves our sympathy. Not because he has been forced to carry out a coup against his own regime, not because his troops are being kidnapped en masse by Pakistani Taliban and then awarded Rs 500 for good behaviour, not because he himself has become a prisoner in his Army House and can't even nip out for coffee and Paan as he used to, but because he has utterly lost his grip over grammar.

In my 15 years in journalism, I have covered three coups. And as I walked towards my office last Saturday, I had the cynicism of someone who has seen it all before. As I entered the BBC offices on a chilly Saturday afternoon in London, a senior Pakistan hand, who like me had interrupted his cosy weekend to cover the story, wondered aloud why the general was taking so long before appearing on national television and explaining his actions.


"His speech writer is too old for all this excitement. He is probably taking his time," I said. Barrister Sharifuddin Peerzada has midwifed every single coup in Pakistan and when General Musharraf took over in 1999, we had to wait until 3 am for him to address the nation. The nation listened to his 10 minutes of neatly turned out verbosity and, relieved, went to sleep. Peerzada may lack in democratic credentials, but he cares about his syntax. Last Saturday as I arrived at my desk, Musharraf had already started his address. And it was immediately clear to me that he had fallen into that aging dictator's familiar trap: He had written his own speech.

I exaggerate because he only occasionally glanced at his notes and for 40 minutes talked, well, gibberish; the kind of stuff that only journalists and think-tank- /wallah/s would take seriously. I was so unsettled ­"not by what he was saying, but by the way he was saying it ­" that I listened to the entire speech again last night.

I have been accused of punctuation abuse often enough to take these things in my stride, but for the 40 minutes that General Musharraf spoke in Urdu, he didn't use one proper sentence.

He replaced his verbs with hand gestures, nouns slipped off his shrugged shoulders, adjectives quivered under his desk.

And when he said, "Extremists have gone very extreme," it suddenly occurred to me why his speech pattern seemed so familiar. He was that uncle that you get stranded with at a family gathering when everybody else has gone to sleep but there is still some whisky left in the bottle. And uncle thinks he is about to say something very profound - if you would only pour him one last one.

Consider this; in the middle of his speech when everyone was silently urging him to get to the point, losing the thread of his diatribe about how judicial activism was responsible for the rise of jihadis in Pakistan, he abruptly said, "I have imposed emergency," then looked into the camera, waved his hand in a dismissive gesture and said, "You must have seen it on TV."

He forgot to mention that he had pulled the plug on /all/ television channels except the State-run television. It might sound like old-school dictator talk, but just imagine if somebody took away your television and then told you, 'Oh, did you see that thing on TV?'

For those who haven't suffered General Musharraf's regime directly, he can come across as a rakish figure, a daredevil who easily switches between his camouflage commando uniform and designer suits and then half sleeved shirts for attending fashion shows - his favourite cultural activity before he was forced to abandon it because of security concerns.

His CV is impressive: Here is a man who can manage the frontline on America's war and terror, get rid of three prime ministers and scores of generals and still find time to write an autobiography and then get George W Bush to endorse it in front of the world media.

I visited Delhi soon after Musharraf's failed Agra summit and he